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1. Introduction 
 
With the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China concluded on 15th 
November 2012 and the birth of a new Politburo Standing Committee, the Party thus 
completed its second orderly hand-over of power in more than six decades of its rule over this 
most populous country in the world, and today, the world’s second largest economic entity. 
Nevertheless, also marking the year 2012 are various other poignant events that have further 
strained State-civil society relations in this vast country. Among these, most undoubtedly 
epitomizing the contemporary sociopolitical dilemmas of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) is the proliferation of public protests mainly related to forced demolition and 
relocation, industrial pollution and official corruption, and related to this, State response to 
civil rights-defending weiquan activism and its treatment of such activists as part of the wider 
dissident community. The continued unfolding of this systemic crisis has, indeed, to be 
properly placed in the overall environmental context of the problem of increasingly acute 
socioeconomic inequality, including its ethnoregional dimension, which in many ways 
constitute the epitome as well as the root of China’s social ills resulted from her recent 
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decades of continuous, astounding economic tour de force while having stagnated are the 
modernization and democratization of its political structure and sociopolitical power 
configuration. 
 
In his cynical take of the teleological hopes invested in the presumed apparent 
continuous transition of the People’s Republic of China from authoritarianism to liberal 
democracy just like what went through with her East Asian neighbours, especially South 
Korea and Taiwan, Dirlik and Prazniak (2012) asked three questions: “First is the relationship 
to the legacies of the revolution of the Party and the people at large, including many 
dissidents, which is hardly the one-dimensional relationship it is often assumed to be. Second 
is the relationship of questions of repression and dissent in the PRC to its structural context 
within global capitalism […] finally, is there a case to be made that the PRC is better off 
exploring socialist alternatives in economy, society and politics than emulating models whose 
future is very much in question, in which case critique should be directed at holding the Party 
to its promise of socialism rather than its failures to live up to the examples of those who 
themselves are in retreat from democracy?” 
 
Dirlik and Prazniak’s first two questions can be viewed in an integrated context, for 
State governance and civil societal response in today’s China are intrinsically inseparable 
while opponents of the Communist Party’s continuing political monopoly has increasingly 
based their challenge upon the increasing socioeconomic injustice under CCP rule in the 
post-Mao era, in facing the “increasing legitimacy” of the Party’s authoritarian grip following 
the last three decade’s miraculous economic success of the “China model”. This has resulted 
in a complex situation wherein while the PRC “presently suffers from severe economic and 
social inequality that may be sustained only by political repression”: 
 
It is frequently overlooked, however, that economic and social inequality are products of the 
very development policies for which the PRC is widely admired. The ironic consequence is 
that criticism directed at the PRC for its democratic deficit is more than compensated for by 
pressures to keep up a pattern and pace of development that gives priority to its functioning 
within the global system over the economic and political welfare of the population. Indeed, 
the “China Model” has more than a few admirers who look to it with envy against the 
“inefficiencies” thrown up by popular pursuit of justice in democratic societies. 
(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 287) 
 
Seen in this context, the teleological inevitability implicit in the democracy activists’ 
claim sounds equally hollow as the CCP’s continuing upholding of its now ragtag socialist 
flag in justifying its “moral obligation” to perpetuate its political monopoly, for as Dirlik and 
Prazniak argue: 
 
Deepening inequality is a pervasive phenomenon of global neoliberalism, of which the PRC 
is an integral part. Around the globe the predicament of democracy has set off a dialectic of 
protest and repression that has further thrown its future into jeopardy in any but a formal 
sense. Within a global context in which democracy is at risk and human rights in shambles, 
what does it mean for the PRC to be moving toward a more democratic regime? 
(ibid.) 
 
 
 
 
Emile K.K. Yeoh, Teleological Ambiguities of the China Model                ICS, UM-EAI, NUS Conference, 12-13 September 2013 
 3
 
2. Socioeconomic Dilemmas of Reform 
 
Charles Dickens described the years of the French Revolution as “the best of times” as well 
as “the worst of times”. The degree of social contradictions that has grown into a highly 
alarming proportion, not only from the perspective of the masses but also well recognized by 
the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 1  as for instance reflected in the amount of 
spending on the weiwen2-related efforts, in China today accompanied by, ironically, an 
unprecedented economic miracle not only from the Chinese perspective but also the global, 
since the tragic ending of the 100-day 1989 Tiananmen protests, has indeed made the 
transposition of Dickens’s well-known adage to present-day China much less preposterous 
than it might appear to be. 
 
Indeed, in an unusual three-part article, “Hu/Wen de Zhengzhi Yichan” [Hu/Wen’s 
political legacy]3, written by Xuexi Shibao’s deputy editor Deng Yuwen – unusual because 
Xuexi Shibao (Study Times) happens to be a magazine run by the Communist Party’s Central 
Party School (which was headed by current president Xi Jinping, the then presumptive next 
State president and Party general secretary), hence the article is seen by most as possibly 
reflecting Xi’s views – Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration’s seven great achievements 
during the past decade are juxtaposed with ten severe problems it has been considered to be 
responsible for during the same period. While proclaiming China’s glorious achievements 
during the reform era as in the first part of Deng’s article posted on 30th August 2012 is 
commonplace inside and outside the country nowadays (the latter such as views popularized 
in the recent, tremendously successful works of Martin Jacques4 and Ezra F. Vogel5), what is 
far from commonplace is the unconcealed tone of the severe criticisms in the second part 
posted on 2nd September, which was followed by the third part giving the author’s 
concluding remarks and recommendations. Expectedly, the three-part article disappeared 
shortly after posting. 
 
At the heart of such contradictions lies the ultimate project of a State manifested in 
the single-mindedness in pursuing greater economic prosperity, sometimes dubbed 
“GDPism”6, a frenzied quest that is increasingly unfolding in recent years to be at a terrible 
social cost, resulting in no small measure from often unchecked power and corruption of CCP 
cadres, officials and princelings and pervading State-business collusion with little regard for 
both public accountability and corporate social responsibility. Such is aggravated by the 
suppression of weiquan (rights-defending) activism and persecution of civil rights activists in 
the name of weiwen (maintaining stability) and the alleged unwritten rule of exempting 
family members of high-level ruling echelon from crime prosecution for the interest of 
politburo solidarity and party-State legitimacy7. Such collusion in service of GDPism8 whose 
achievement in turn lends legitimacy to the regime is referred to in the two suggestions made 
in Lynn T. White’s study on China, Thailand, Taiwan and the Philippines: “First, 
opportunities for political support by networks with effective power – sometimes mostly in 
the state, but often mostly in local business elites – cause economic growth or its lack. 
Second, such growth, if they can arrange it, strengthens those elites’ capacities as against 
rivals, in whatever type of regime they have.” (White, 2009: 9) 
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Nevertheless, it would not be from a balanced perspective if all these aberrations and 
inhuman consequences from GDPism are blamed on State-business collusion and corruption, 
and the local governments’ weiwen overdrive. After all, many cash-trapped and debt-ridden 
local governments might have no choice but to heavily rely on developmental projects for 
their revenues9 in this vast polity said to be the world’s most economically decentralized 
country10 where the centre expects relative self-sufficiency of the local economy whether at 
the provincial level or the county level and the local governments are expected to be fully 
responsible for the launching and coordination of local reform, for local economic 
development, and for legislation and law enforcement within their respective jurisdictions. 
Putting such context together with the country’s acute interlocal and interregional economic 
disparity, it will not be surprising to see inhuman forced demolitions becoming the rule of the 
day to make way for lucrative property development, or even manufacturing and mining 
ventures with little regard for human lives, labour rights and environmental consequences. 
Under such circumstances, these State actions of course unavoidably need to be coercive, 
leading to protests and resistance from the affected masses, which in turn lead to more 
repression in the name of weiwen including beatings, lock-ups and even murders, in the harsh 
environment of a legal system hostile and harmful not only to the rights defense movement 
but also the rights defense lawyers:  
 
There are notorious “evil laws” against lawyers on the books, in particular against those 
perceived to be rights defence lawyers. In the Criminal Procedure Law, there are 
discriminatory provisions imposing onerous limitations on lawyers in meeting with their 
clients, accessing evidence, and investigating facts. The Criminal Law includes broad and 
vague provisions about “state secrets” that have been cited to prevent lawyers from 
investigating and obtaining a whole range of evidence. Most notorious is Article 306 of the 
Criminal Law with regards to “fabricating evidence”, which makes lawyers’ position 
disturbingly precarious and has been arbitrarily used to charge hundreds of lawyers in general 
and convict many high profile rights defence lawyers in particular. 
(Feng, Hawes and Gu, 2012: 330) 
 
In an eye-catching article “Zhongguo Zhenzheng de Tiaozhan zai Nali” [Where lie 
China’s real challenges?] by Yuan Peng, director of the Institute of American Studies at 
China’s Academy of Contemporary International Relations, published on 31st July 2012 in 
the overseas edition of the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), rights-defending lawyers 
(weiquan lüshi), dissidents, underground religious groups (supposed to refer mainly to the 
illegal Catholic and Protestant churches outside the government-sanctioned “patriotic 
churches”), disadvantaged groups and leaders of the netizens are grouped as the five types of 
people acting as the channels through which the United States is infiltrating China’s 
grassroots to bring about change from bottom up.11 Besides the timing of the appearance of 
the article – just prior to CCP’s 18th National Congress – the accusative warning brought 
back memory of Mao’s “five black types” (landlords, wealthy peasants, antirevolutionaries, 
bad elements and rightists) during the Cultural Revolution and hence the article’s five 
categories are referred to by some readers as the “new five black types”. The accusation is 
ominous, and placing civil rights lawyers at the top of the list could be a warning that State 
repression would be intensified upon those in the legal profession who dare to defend in court 
those dissidents that the State is going after or to take up civil rights cases against the routine 
State persecution in the name of weiwen and hexie. On the other hand, grouping together the 
different strands of dissent as targets to suppress also reflects a certain degree of concern over 
the potential threat posed to the one-party State by a better coalescence of these different 
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strands of dissent to form a common front in the pursuit of some transplanted “velvet” or 
“jasmine” revolution. 
 
Indeed, miraculous economic performance and urban modernization accompanied by 
uncontrolled widening socioeconomic inequalities and the lack of rule of law (and often 
“lawless” local governments especially in the cases of the suppression of local civil rights 
activists and demolition of residential houses to make way for lucrative property development) 
have characterized the past three decades of Chinese development during the market-reform 
era. The problem is often blamed on Deng Xiaoping’s maxim “let some people get rich first” 
directive and the rugged capitalist approach to economic reform. However, as argued by 
Dirlik and Prazniak (2012), the issue at hand is bigger than just the misconduct of the local 
cadres or the nature of the political system: 
 
[…] the most widespread causes of discontent – forceful expropriation of agricultural land, 
widespread dislocation of the population, severe exploitation of labour, social and spatial 
inequalities, corruption from the top to the bottom of the political structure, urban and rural 
pollution – are all entangled in the development policies that the PRC has pursued since the 
1980s in its quest of “wealth and power” within the context of a neo-liberal global capitalism 
[…] The conversion of land into capital, the creation of a floating labour force available for 
this process, and the sale of cheap labour power to fuel an export-oriented economy are all 
aspects of capital accumulation within a globalized capitalist economy. If anything 
distinguishes the PRC, it is the presence of a sprawling organizational structure put in place 
by the revolution that has guaranteed the efficient performance of these processes, with 
coercion whenever necessary. 
(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 295) 
 
Besides, begging the question as to the glory of China’s success in the past decade is 
the apparent failure in establishing the rule of law under the Hu-Wen administration. The 
factors at work here could in fact be similar to the reasons why North Korea is so resistant to 
economic reform (Kim, 2012), for establishing a comprehensive framework of the rule of law 
could eventually harm the self-declared legitimacy of one-Party rule, jeopardize the wenwen 
efforts, and destabilize the sociopolitical status quo that GDPism has so far succeeded to 
maintain. An example, besides “evil laws” and other hostile institutional arrangements” mentioned 
earlier, is “the naked violence of the State Security Division of the police, political police 
specialized in the suppression of political enemies of the Party[, who] are given extra-legal 
powers to keep their targets under round-the-clock surveillance, and even engage in 
kidnapping and physical assault on their targets, some of whom include rights defense 
lawyers” (Feng, Hawes and Gu, 2012: 331):  
 
Many rights defence lawyers have become victims of these “evil laws” and hostile 
institutional arrangements. More often than not, the cases represented by rights defence 
lawyers are those sensitive cases avoided by ordinary lawyers and it is almost impossible for 
the rights defence lawyers and their clients to win the cases of this nature. Worse still, many 
defence lawyers representing those sensitive cases have been turned into defendants 
themselves by the state procurators on the charges fabricating evidence, leaking state secrets 
or inciting subversion of state power […] And in the most recent government pre-emptive 
strike on Middle Eastern-style protests in connection with an online call to gather in public 
places – the so-called Jasmine Spring of 2011 – rights lawyers have again become major 
targets of intimidation and abuse. 
(ibid.) 
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Zhang Wei, a senior research fellow at University of Nottingham’s China Policy 
Institute, in a recent interview by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), rejected the 
popular claim that the Hu-Wen administration was responsible for the past decade of China’s 
unprecedented economic growth which he attributed instead to the economic reforms 
arduously engineered by earlier leaders in the 1980s and 1990s whose cumulative benefits 
were being reaped by the present administration. On the contrary, the Hu-Wen administration 
were characterized in the past decade by its lack of any substantial reforms in economic or 
political institution, as well as by the most draconian State control of society including the 
worst repression on civil rights activists and press freedom since the 1980s, which as Dirlik 
and Prazniak observe, combined to contribute to the complication of the overall problem of 
repression and dissent in the PRC: 
 
Despite state pretensions to legality, the “crimes” for which intellectuals such as Ai Weiwei, 
Chen Guangcheng and Liu Xiaobo have been harassed, condemned, incarcerated and tortured 
(sometimes to death, as in the recent case of Li Wangyang) do not go beyond testing the 
limits of restrictive laws and even greater restrictiveness in their application. Restrictions on 
speech supposedly guaranteed by the PRC’s own constitution are routine practice. 
Unemployed peasant workers are employed by the authorities to provide round-the-clock 
surveillance of victims whose only crime is to transgress against what the authorities deem 
the limits of speech or to pursue justice in the courts. The Party does not hesitate to resort to 
thuggery in order to enforce arbitrary restrictions. It is little wonder that the internal security 
budget of the PRC is larger than its defense budget. 
(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 288) 
 
Far from being comparable with earlier leaders like Deng Xiaoping or even Jiang 
Zemin and Zhu Rongji in terms of reform efforts, according to Zhang Wei, the Hu-Wen 
administration are directly responsible for the acute social contradictions resulted especially 
from spiraling income and wealth disparities.12 This would not come as a surprise, as Dirlik 
and Prazniak remind us “that most of the criticism directed against the PRC for its ‘socialist’ 
failures overlooks the fundamental national interest that guides the Communist regime’s 
domestic and foreign policies, including the repressive exploitation of its own population in 
the name of development and security.” (ibid.: 293) 
 
 
3. Poverty Reduction and Rising Inequality 
 
Even while the overall proportion of population in poverty dropped impressively from 
30.7 per cent in 1978 to 3.4 per cent in 2000, according to government statistics, income 
inequality was increasing, with the Gini coefficient reaching 0.415 in 1995 and continuing to 
rise (Chai et al., 2004: 2). At his first press conference in 2003 as China’s premier, Wen 
Jiabao summarized the coming headaches in his new post in a group of figures, including 
China’s labour force of 740 million vis-à-vis the Western advanced countries’ total of just 
430 million, and China’s annual additional labour force of 10 million, xiagang and 
unemployed figure of about 14 million, and the rural-to-urban migrant labour of about 120 
million – all giving rise to the huge employment pressure the country was facing (Liu, 2010). 
In terms of poverty and stratification, Wen pointed out that there were 900 million peasants 
among the country’s total population of 1.3 billion, with about 30 million still being trapped 
in poverty – and the latter figure was derived based on annual income per capita of 625 
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yuan13 which was in fact too low a poverty line: if the line were to be more accurately placed 
at 825 yuan, the rural poverty population would be about 900 million. In terms of 
interregional disparity, Wen pointed out that the GDP of the 5 or 6 provinces in eastern, 
coastal China had exceeded 50 per cent of the national total GDP (ibid.). 
 
Hence, while China’s reforms have been successful in giving many people higher 
incomes and producing more goods and services, they also led to increasingly acute 
inequality in income and wealth among the populace. From one of the most egalitarian 
societies in the 1970s, China has turned into one of the most unequal countries in the region 
and even among developing countries in general. Bert Hoffman of the World Bank noted in 
2006 that China’s Gini had risen from 0.25 – equal to that of Germany – in 1980 to about 
0.45 today, as the country becomes less equal than Russia or the USA. Yan (2010), on the 
other hand, gave a “conservative” Gini estimate of 0.475 for the year 2007. In the 1980s the 
richest 10 per cent of the people of China earned 7 times the income of the poorest 10 per 
cent, today they earn more than 18 times as much.14 Or as another observer put it, “Ever since 
the early years of reforms, the divide between the rich and the poor had been emerging, and it 
is now getting to the stage of ripping the entire society apart.” (Zhou, 2006: 286). 
 
Similarly, Yan (2010) gave a high Gini for all China as early as in 1994 at above 0.43, 
which had risen to a “conservative” estimate of 0.475 in 2007, which is of course a far cry 
from the Gini of below 0.3 (averages of 0.16 and 0.22 for urban and rural areas respectively) 
before the economic reforms. This alarmingly high Gini of 0.475 in 2007 represented a 
growth of 135 per cent from 1978, over a 29-year period in which GDP per capita (at 
constant prices) had grown by almost 10 times over the pre-reform level with an average 
annual growth rate of 8.6 per cent. Yan (2010: 176-177) divided this growth of inequality 
into four phases: 
• the “relatively egalitarian” (by international standard) period of 1978-1984 with Gini 
between 0.2 and 0.3 and little urban-rural disparity, while the rural economy developed 
immensely under the full force of reform; 
• the “relatively justifiable” period of 1985-1992 with Gini hovering between 0.3 and 0.4 
while the whole economy was expanding vibrantly with the emphasis of reform shifted to the 
cities since 1984, though the accompanying inflation and expansion of the income gap had 
begun to overshoot people’s psychological expectation threshold, resulting in rather serious 
social instability; 
• the worrying period of 1993-2000 of yearly increasing Gini index, with increasingly rapid 
reform and marketization pushing Gini over the international alarming line of 0.4 in 1993, 
and further over 0.43 in 1994, before the coefficient dropped back below 0.4 in 1995 and 
1996 but rose again with increasing urban-rural, employment, intercommunal and inter-
stratum differentiation amidst the intensifying marketization and growth of the private-sector 
economy following the 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)15; 
• the high interest polarization period since 2001 to the present wherein the globalization of 
China’s growing economy and the wealth effect of the capital market have led to the 
continuous expansion of the income gap, with Gini reaching 0.475 in 2007, even by 
“conservative” estimation. 
 
Yan (2010: 177-178) further pointed out that China’s rural Gini has always been 
higher than the urban, implying that the intra-rural income disparity is fueling the expansion 
of the national income disparity, while the urban-rural income disparity is almost the main 
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cause of the continuous expansion of the national income gap. In fact, the 20 per cent urban 
highest income group’s income is shown to be 5.5 times the income of the 20 per cent urban 
lowest income group whereas the 20 per cent rural highest income group’s income is 7.3 
times the income of the 20 per cent rural lowest income group.16 Besides urban-rural, such 
widening of income and wealth disparity is also manifest in various other aspects (Table 2). 
Yan’s analysis shows further that changes in national Gini is positively related to changes in 
urban-rural income ratio, and concludes that China’s present Gini coefficient has reached a 
stage of too big a disparity and could be even higher if various informal incomes of the 
middle stratum and upper stratum are included in the calculation, even allowing for some 
scholars’ view that China’s Gini could be permitted to be higher, e.g. at 0.45, a line that had 
almost been reached as early as in 2001. 
 
 
Table 2     China’s Income and Wealth Disparity: Results of Various Surveys and Estimations 
Data 
source 
Item Highest income/greatest 
wealth 
Lowest  income/least 
wealth 
Note 
Proportion of wealth in 
family wealth per capita 
Highest 20% residents 
having 72.41% 
Lowest 20% residents 
having 1.35% 
Gini coefficient 
= 0.6865 
Chinese 
Academy 
of Social 
Sciences 
Proportion of residential 
house estate in family 
wealth per capita 
Eastern region: 81.4% 
Non-agricultural 
households: 80.7% 
Urban households: 82.0% 
Western region: 66.5% 
Agricultural households: 
69.6% 
Rural households: 
72.1% 
Sample volume 
= 5118 
Proportion of household 
average saving deposits in 
urban renminbi deposits 
Largest (household 
average) 20% households 
having 64.4% 
Smallest (household 
average) 20% 
households having 1.3% 
Local currency 
deposits: 
differential = 
49.5 
China’s 
Renmin 
(People’s) 
Bank 
Proportion of household 
average saving deposits in 
urban foreign currency 
deposits 
Largest 20% households 
having 88.1% 
Smallest 20% 
households having 0.3% 
Foreign 
currency 
deposits: 
differential = 
293.7 
Urban-rural income ratio About 40% of urban 
residents getting near 70% 
About 60% of rural 
residents getting near 
30% 
Income 
differential = 
2.33 times 
National 
Bureau of 
Statistics 
High-low income groups’ 
income ratio 
20% high-income group 
getting 40% income 
80% middle- and lower-
income group getting 
60% income 
Income 
proportion of 
high-income 
group getting 
larger 
 
Source: Yan (2010: 180), Table 4-1. 
 
 
In terms of income ranking, the social stratum that is rising fastest since the beginning 
of the “reform and open” policy is that of the private entrepreneurs, followed by managers, 
State and social administrators, skilled professionals, and business and industry getihu17 
(Table 3). The inter-stratum income gap has indeed been expanding with the differential 
between the highest average monthly income stratum (that of the State and social 
administrators up to 1980 and that of the private enterprise owners after 1980) and lowest 
income stratum (always been that of the agricultural labourers) spiraling from 3.8:1 during 
the 1971-1980 period (52.8 yuan) to 19.9:1 by 2005 (754.4 yuan) (Table 4). 
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Table 3     China: Ranking of Ten Major Social Strata by Average Monthly Income 
            Period 
Stratum 
Before 
1971 
1971-
1980 
1981-
1990 
1991-
1999 
2000-
2001 
2005 Overall 
ranking 
Overall 
ranking 
of last 
four 
periods 
State and social 
administrative 
stratum (2.1%) 
1 1 4 3 3 4 3 3 
Managerial 
stratum (1.6%) 
3 2 3 4 2 2 2 2 
Private enterprise 
owner stratum 
(1.0%) 
– – 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Professional 
skilled stratum 
(4.6%) 
2 3 6 5 4 5 4 5 
Officer stratum 
(7.2%) 
6 7 8 6 6 3 7 6 
Individually-
owned business & 
industry (getihu) 
stratum (7.1%) 
7 6 2 2 5 6 5 4 
Commercial- and 
service-sector 
personnel stratum 
(11.2%) 
4 4 5 7 7 8 6 7 
Worker stratum 
(17.5%) 
5 5 7 8 8 7 8 8 
Agricultural 
labourer stratum 
(42.9%) 
8 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Urban and rural 
vagrant, 
unemployed and 
semi-unemployed 
stratum (4.8%) 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
 
Source: Yan (2010: 186), Table 4-4; stratum’s present proportion in brackets from Li and Chen (2004: 
13), Figure 1-3. 
 
 
Table 4     China: Average Monthly Income of Ten Major Social Strata and Differential 
 Before 1971 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-1999 2000-2001 2005 
Mean value of 
the strata’s 
average 
monthly 
incomes 
42 52.8 145.3 465.3 641.1 754.4 
Income 
differential 
between highest 
and lowest 
stratum 
2.7 3.8 13.8 21.7 19.4 19.9 
 
Source: Yan (2010: 179), Figure 4-3. 
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4. Public Protests and Social Crisis 
 
Poverty and inequality are among the key factors underlying social disturbances. 
Various estimates have shown an increase in collective protest incidents from 8,700 in 1994 
to 90,000 in 2006 and further to 127,000 in 2008.18 According to official statistics, “illegal” 
quntixing shijian (or qunti shijian, literally “mass incidents”) nationwide increased from 
10,000 to 74,000 cases over the decade of 1994-2004, with an average annual growth rate of 
22.2 per cent, while the number of people involved in the qunti shijian went up from 730,000 
to 3,760,000, with an average annual growth rate of 17.8 per cent (Hu, Hu and Wang, 2006). 
The figures continued to climb to 87,000 cases and about 4 million people by 2005 (Yeoh, 
2010: 256, Figures 9 and 10). In general, the number of qunti shijian had been rising at an 
alarmingly increasing rate. From a growth of about 10 per cent from 1995 to 1996, qunti 
shijian was growing at an average annual rate of as high as 25.5 per cent from 1997 to 2004, 
i.e. higher than the average growth rate of 22.2 per cent during the decade of 1994-2004, with 
annual growth in certain years reaching as high as above 40 per cent; or with 1994 figure 
indexed 100, a steep increase of the index from 100 to 740 in terms of the number of cases 
during the decade of 1994-2004 (an increase of 6.4 times) and from 100 to 515 in terms of 
the number of people involved (an increase of 4.2 times) (ibid.). 
 
4.1. Nature and Types of Public Protests 
 
In terms of the participants’ profiles, while at the beginning the people involved in 
these “mass incidents” were mainly xiagang workers19 and peasants (reflecting land loss and 
corruption issues) but later on the list of participants expanded to include, besides xiagang 
workers and peasants who lost their lands, also workers, urban residents, private individual 
enterprise owners (getihu), teachers, students and a small number of ex-servicemen and 
cadres, etc. (Hu, Hu, He and Guo, 2009: 143; Yeoh, 2010: 257, Figure 11), thus reflecting 
expanding and deepening popular interest conflicts and contradictions. The changing and 
expanding class structure is not only a society-wide phenomenon but also occurring within 
the particular social class itself, thus making the grievances of the class-within-class even 
more acute. Such is the inevitable consequence of a lopsided development which while 
having created an urban middle class evident of developmental success and managed 
successfully to feed the country’s huge population, with “the second largest economy in the 
world, the PRC nevertheless ranks among the world’s poorest countries in terms of per capita 
GDP” and with most of the wealth being “concentrated in the hands of the top 20 per cent of 
the population, but especially the top one per cent [while the] rural population which is still 
the majority languishes as agriculture is commercialized, with increasing participation from 
agribusiness” (Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 297). Regarding the last point, Donaldson and Zhang 
gives a incisive classification of China’s farmers today into five categories based on their role 
as direct producers and their class relations with the agribusinesses – “commercial farmers” 
who work independently on allocated family land; “contract farmers” who work on allocated 
family land to fulfill company contracts, whose harvests are sold to the contracting 
companies, and while being dominated by the companies manage to retain some flexibility; 
“semi-proletarian farmers with Chinese characteristics”, mainly hired villagers who work on 
collective land rented to companies as company employees, whose harvests belong to the 
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company, and while being dominated by the companies manage to enjoy a degree of 
entitlement; “semi-proletarian farm workers”, mainly hired migrant labourers who work on 
company land as company employees, whose harvests belong to the companies, and while 
being dominated by the companies do have family land at home as a fall-back option; and 
“proletarian farm workers”, mainly hired landless labourers who work on company land as 
employees, whose harvests belong to the companies, and who, unlike the other four 
categories, suffer from complete domination by the companies (Donaldson and Zhang, 2009: 
99, Table 6.1). On the other hand, on the urban front, 
 
[…] the population is being crammed into “megacities” beset with problems of pollution, 
traffic, and the yet unpredictable toll on the population of life under such circumstances. The 
working population is still subject to abuse at the hands of domestic and foreign corporations. 
Workers fight back, needless to say, and the second generation of peasant-workers are less 
amenable to exploitation and prejudice than their parents. Much of the repressive apparatus of 
the state is directed to keeping under control, with violence if necessary, protests against 
inequality, exploitation, unjust plunder of public resources, rights to land in particular, and 
environmental pollution. State terrorism against these protests includes incarceration, torture 
and outright murder of their leaders, with similar treatment meted out to intellectuals and 
lawyers who throw in their lot with popular protests. 
(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 297) 
 
On the other hand, Tong and Lei (2010) documented a total of 248 “large-scale mass 
incidents” (those with more than 500 participants, according to China’s Ministry of Public 
Security)20 from 2003 to 2009 (Table 5). While large-scale mass incidents come in various 
types, labour and land/relocation disputes top the list (Figure 2), followed by social 
disturbances and riots usually triggered by isolated incidents but reflecting the people’s long-
simmering distrust of local government officials with accusation of corruption and 
government-business collusion (guan-shang goujie): the well-known cases being the 
Weng’an incident of 2008, Shishou incident of 2009 and the recent riots in mid-June 2011 
involving thousands in Taizhou, Zhejiang Province, in a series of latest large-scale riots that 
also included the disturbances in Guangdong Province’s Chaozhou, Zhejiang Province’s 
Shaoxing, Hubei Province’s Lichuan and Xintang township of Zengcheng City (of the 
metropolis of Guangzhou, Guangdong Province).21 It is undeniable that underlying these 
large-scale public protests is the issue of rapidly growing economic inequality in the forms of 
widening income gap, lack of social safety net and perception of social and government 
injustice, as Tong and Lei commented, “[…] local governments and police force were 
generally perceived as corrupt and incompetent. The fact that the police force were often 
dispatched in favour of the capitalists who have close relationship with the government 
whenever there was a dispute between peasants and the companies reinforced the public 
perception. There was a profound distrust of the government.” (Tong and Lei, 2010: 498) 
Such social disturbances and riots with no specific economic demands are seen as the most 
system-threatening because they are challenging rather then endorsing regime legitimacy: 
 
The outburst of disturbances is often the product of broad and diffused social grievances over 
a variety of issues ranging from inequality, corruption and social injustice to increasing drug 
addiction. Disturbance is often triggered by poor local governance, especially the misconduct 
of chengguan [i.e. staff members of the city management agency] or the police. In these cases, 
social anger, not economic demands, is directed at the authorities. 
(Tong and Lei, 2010: 501) 
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Table 5     China: Large-scale Mass Incidents, 2003-2009 
 
Year Total Number of Large-scale Mass Incidents 
2003 9 
2004 20 
2005 9 
2006 25 
2007 63 
2008 76 
2009 46 
 
Source: Tong and Lei (2010: 489), Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1     China: Frequency of Large-scale Mass Incidents by Province, 2003-2009 
 
 
Source: Tong and Lei (2010: 490), Table 1. 
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Figure 2     Large-scale Mass Incidents by Type (Total Number during 2003-2009) 
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Source: Tong and Lei (2010: 491), Table 2. 
 
 
4.2. Distrust of Political Authority 
 
The frequency and scale of the recent riots has undeniably been increasingly alarming 
to the government, giving rise to the allegation that the Xintang authorities were under the 
direct secret order of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party to fabricate the image of the mid-June 2011 Xintang riots as purely clashes 
between the Sichuan migrant workers and the local Cantonese, even by enlisting the 
underworld to orchestrate attacks, in order to transform the protests against the government 
into inter-communal conflicts and to justify the suppression of public protests and 
demonstrations. On the other hand, the government media Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) 
has blamed the riots on cultural clash between migrant workers and the local people, while 
some scholars have attributed the recent Guangdong riots to the recession of an open 
economy, and the lack of security in the livelihood of the twenty million migrant workers in 
the province who are also suffering from discrimination and being bullied and harassed by 
the local underworld and other powers that be, and most fundamentally, the intriguing 
relationship between the Communist Party-State which continues to represent and embody 
the interest of the working class and the real working-class masses: 
 
Possibly most fundamental in terms of the number of lives it touches and the structural 
inequalities it expresses is the disturbed relationship of the Party-state to the working, 
especially the agrarian working population. An urban vision against the earlier Maoist 
glorification of the peasantry and practical necessities of capital accumulation have 
combined in a development policy that owes much of its success to dispossession of the 
agrarian population and the exploitation of agrarian labour driven off agriculture – the 
so-called “peasant-workers” (nongmingong). The exploitation of agrarian resources and 
labour was severe under Mao’s leadership as well, but this time around the returns have 
been plundered by the ruling elite, mostly from the Party or with Party connections, that 
has produced one of the most unequal societies in the world. Conflicts over illegal or 
unjust confiscations of land by local cadres are at the source of the majority of the 
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disturbances that numbered close to 200,000 [in 2011]. Villages have been emptied out 
of their young men and women, leaving behind the elderly and the very young, severely 
affecting family structures. The 150-200 million estimated migrant population of 
workers not only are treated like “illegal” migrants in being deprived of access to city 
amenities (including education and health), but are also a source of friction among the 
population because of ethnic and place differences. Depending upon the constitution of 
the migrant workers at any one place, gender and ethnic tensions are added to the class 
oppression and exploitation that has been a motor force of the PRC’s development over 
the last two decades. With rare exceptions such as the Wukan Uprising in Guangdong 
in 2011, the Party-State responds to expressions of popular unrest with further 
suppression and, when necessary, violence. 
(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 289) 
 
On the other hand, Beijing sociologist Yu Jianrong pointed to the alarming fact that 
the recent spate of social disturbances (see Table 6)22, e.g. in Lizhou (Hubei) and Inner 
Mongolia, were triggered by “sudden events/emergencies” (tufa shijian) and their 
participants were mostly unrelated to the original cause and without clear interest demands.23 
However, in venting their discontent towards society, the absence of “free-floating 
aggression” is notable (in contrast with, e.g., the recent summer riots across British cities in 
August 2011), and the government and State authorities have been the main targets of attack. 
Widespread support has even been noted on the Internet for such attacks on government 
offices and even in the case of the killing of judges. During the spate of wanton killings of 
primary school and kindergarten children that shocked the nation in 2010, the sudden 
outbreak of fatal free-floating aggression against these young children across China that 
occurred from March to May 2010 which caused the death of a total of 17 people, including 
15 children, and injured more than 80, in a string of five major attacks and four other cases 
that occurred from 23rd March to 12th May (including those that killed 8 and injured 5 in Fujian 
province, killed 2 and injured 5 in Guangxi, injured 19 in Guangdong, injured 32 in Jiangsu, injured 5 
in Shandong and killed 9 in Shaanxi), and another attack on 3rd August that killed 4 and injured 
more than 20 at a kindergarten in Shandong (Yeoh, 2010: 247), an ironic banner allegedly 
appeared at the gate of a kindergarten which read: “Yuan You Tou Zhai You Zhu, Qianmian 
You Zhuan Shi Zhengfu” [there’s a real culprit responsible for any wrong or any debt; take a 
right turn in front you’ll find the government (offices)]. While this can be interpreted as a 
sarcastic advice to re-direct the free-floating aggression towards the real target of social 
grievances, the alleged State orchestration of the perception of Xintang disturbances as a 
clash between the migrant workers and local people would be tantamount to an attempt in re-
channelling the anti-State sentiments into inter-communal scapegoating.24 Stemming from 
profound distrust of the government, as Tong and Lei (2010) observed above, such social 
disturbances and riots with no specific economic demands are the most system-threatening as 
they are challenging rather than endorsing regime legitimacy. 
 
While admittedly not all forms of social protests are seen as system-threatening and 
ironically some that at first look seem to be system-threatening may instead work for the 
ruling regime’s advantage (Yeoh, 2011: 439-444, 481-483), the intensification of public 
protests all over the country (e.g. 19 incidents of public protest just within three days from 
17th to 19th October 201225) has serve to demonstrate the level of despair in facing the 
onslaught of oppressive State-business collusion in the name of economic miracle and 
national glory so lauded by the upper classes and co-opted intelligentsia both domestic and 
among the Overseas Chinese communities, with similar accusation by death still spreading 
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among the Tibetans in the ethnic Tibetan regions of China unceasingly in protecting against 
similar oppression. While such problems are well understood by the central government, 
there does not seem to be any way out of the quagmire that is trapping at least over 620,000 
villages all over China, according to a New York Times analysis26, where rapidly rising land 
prices are encouraging both village cadres and higher-tier officials to abuse public office to 
engage in rent-seeking activities at the expense of the villagers in a gargantuan, complex 
nexus of interest entanglement, both horizontal and vertical. At the same time, the village 
committee elections system, so lauded by many observers as a bold step of grassroots 
democratization, has ironically worsened official corruption and “backdoor” practices for 
such village elections are seldom really free or fair, and independent candidates unendorsed 
by the Party are continuously being blocked from standing, harassed or even brutalized, while 
the election process is being easily manipulated. 
 
 
 
Table 6     Spate of Social Disturbances in May-June 2011 
Beginning 
date of riot 
Place Details 
3rd May Shehong County, 
Sichuan Province 
After a secondary school teacher was mistaken as a 
murderer and beaten up by plain-cloth policemen, over a 
thousand people including teachers and students 
demonstrated and destroyed the police station and county 
government office. 
13th May Tianzhu County, Gansu 
Province  
A dismissed employee threw petrol bomb and injured over 
60 people. 
23rd May Inner Mongolia Death of a herdsman after being hit by a coal truck led to 
demonstrations. 
26th May Fuzhou City, Jiangxi 
Province 
A shangfang petitioner detonated bombs at three places 
including the city attorney’s office, killing 3 and injuring 9. 
6th June Chaozhou City, 
Guangdong Province 
On 1st June, a 19-year-old Sichuan migrant worker Xiong 
Hanjiang asking for unpaid wages of 2,000 yuan was 
assaulted and had his hand and leg muscles severed, leading 
to a 10000-people riot, with 18 injured. The badly injured 
Xiong had recovered in the hospital but could be 
handicapped for life. 
8th June Shaoxing City, Zhejiang 
Province 
Seven thousand workers and villagers demonstrated against 
a tin foil factory that had been polluting the place for many 
years. 
9th June Lichuan County, Hubei 
Province 
After former anti-corruption office director Ran Jianxin died 
during interrogation, over a thousand people who believed 
he was beaten to death walked on the streets and clashed 
with police. 
10th June Xintang Township, 
Guangdong Province 
A pregnant Sichuan woman and her husband who were 
roadside pedlars were beaten up by security personnel who 
were allegedly extorting protection money from the couple, 
leading to a riot by over a thousand Sichuan migrant 
workers who destroyed the government office and police 
vehicles, reportedly with 5 people killed, over a hundred 
injured and hundreds arrested. There are five million 
Sichuan migrant workers in Guangdong, of whom a hundred 
thousand are in Xintang. 
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12th June Zhengzhou City, Henan 
Province 
Over 400 residents of Waliu Village of Shifo Township 
demonstrated against the government over forced relocation 
and unfair compensation, after unidentified thugs beat up 
villagers protecting their homes. 
13th June Changsha City, Hunan 
Province 
Over 500 residents demonstrated against the government 
over forced relocation. 
14th June Loudi City, Hunan 
Province 
Residents demonstrated against the building of a 220,000-
volt cable tower; many injured. 
15th June Taizhou City, Zhejiang 
Province 
Believing that the village official of the Jiaojiang District 
had been embezzling land acquisition subsidies over the past 
nine years, thousands of villagers besieged and destroyed 
Sinopec’s petrol station. 
 
 
4.3. Socioeconomic Transformation, Political Actions and the Social Order 
 
It should be noted that many issues of high social concern such as land requisition and 
relocation27 (which has particularly attracted attention in various dingzihu28 cases), wage, 
employment, housing and accommodation, environment and food hygiene and safety are 
closely linked in this country to the issue of corruption and government-business collusion 
(guan-shang goujie, here referring to the collusion between local government officials and 
businessmen or entrepreneurs in return for favours) and contribute to widespread popular 
resentment and constitute the source of most public protests – officially labeled quntixing 
shijian or qunti shijian, literally “mass incidents” which take various forms “from peaceful 
small-group petitions and sit-ins to marches and rallies, labor strikes, merchant strikes, 
student demonstrations, ethnic unrest, and even armed fighting and riots” (Tanner, 2004: 138) 
– often against the police and the local governments. 
 
After the crackdown on the massive 1989 demonstrations which actually began with 
smaller-scale anti-corruption protests, this root cause of the protests has gone worse, not 
better. Citing Sun Yan in Current History (2005), Hutton (2006: 127) reminded us that 
“large-scale corruption is mounting. The average ‘take’ in the 1980s was $5000; now it is 
over $250,000. The number of arrests of senior cadre members above the county level 
quadrupled between 1992 and 2001 […] In 2005 it was disclosed that a cool $1 billion had 
been misappropriated or embezzled in Gansu, one of China’s poorest provinces, by a ring of 
forty or more officials.” Hutton cited Hu’s (2006) estimate that the annual economic loss due 
to corruption over the late 1990s alone amounted to between 13.3 and 16.9 per cent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), while evidence provided by government departments revealed that 
the annual economic loss between 1999 and 2001 due to corruption averaged 14.5 to 14.9 per 
cent of GDP.29 As Hutton (2006: 127) noted, “Every incident of corruption – smuggling, 
embezzlement, theft, swindling, bribery – arises in the first place from the unchallengeable 
power of communist officials and the lack of any reliable, independent system of 
accountability and scrutiny […] the evidence of the depth of corruption at the apex of 
government, business and finance, mean that any paradoxical usefulness [of corruption in the 
early years of reform in providing flexibility to an otherwise highly bureaucratic system] has 
long since been surpassed. Corruption to this extent is chronically dysfunctional and even 
threatens the integrity of the state.” This threat to the integrity of the State is most evident in 
the worrying frequency of incidents of social unrest which mostly stem from protests against 
local official corruption and abuse of power, including the local governments’ suppression of 
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weiquan-shangfang30. For instance, in 2005 alone, such public order disturbances amounted 
to 87,000 cases, or an average of almost 240 a day, involving about 4 million people31. While 
social unrest among farmers and workers has long been observed since the early 1990s, as 
Lum (2006: “Summary”) described, “recent protest activities have been broader in scope, 
larger in average size, greater in frequency, and more brash than those of a decade ago”: 
 
According to Chinese Communist Party sources, social unrest has grown by nearly 50% in 
the past two years, culminating in a particularly violent episode in December 2005. China’s 
Public Security Ministry declared that there were 87,000 cases of “public order disturbance” 
– including protests, demonstrations, picketing, and group petitioning – in 2005 compared to 
74,000 reported cases in 2004. In 2003, the PRC government reported more than 58,000 
“major incidents of social unrest” involving an estimated 3 million to 10 million persons, of 
which 700, or less than 2%, involved clashes with police, while a Hong Kong-based labor 
rights group estimated that the number of labor demonstrations reached 300,000 that year. 
The December 2005 clash between villagers and People’s Armed Police (PAP) in Dongzhou 
village (Shanwei city), southeastern Guangdong province, in which 3-20 villagers were killed, 
became a symbol of the depth of anger of those with grievances and the unpredictability of 
the outcomes of social disputes. 
(Lum, 2006: 1-2) 
 
Figure 3 is a stylized presentation based on Zhao (2008) which shows different forms 
and levels of political action as a function of the degree of organization, of 
institutionalization/routinization and of targeted changes. The forms and manifestations might 
be different – from large-scale demonstrations of 1989 to the sporadic but frequent eruption 
of, often violent, public protests nowadays, including ethnoregional riots – but they all share 
a basic underlying element that the power that be might not be willing to recognize: 
 
In any social order […] there is always a strong element of dissension about the distribution 
of power and values. Hence […] any institutional system is never fully homogeneous in the 
sense of being fully accepted or accepted to the same degree by all those participating in it 
[…] Thus "antisystems" may develop within any society. Although the antisystems often 
remain latent for long periods of time, they may also constitute, under propitious conditions, 
important foci of systematic change. The existence of such potential antisystems is evident in 
the existence in all societies of themes and orientations of protest. 
(Eisenstadt, 1992: 417) 
 
According to official statistics, “illegal” qunti shijian nationwide increased from 
10,000 to 74,000 cases over the decade of 1994-2004, with an average annual growth rate of 
22.2 per cent, while the number of people involved in the qunti shijian went up from 730,000 
to 3,760,000, with an average annual growth rate of 17.8 per cent (Hu, Hu and Wang, 2006). 
The figures continued to climb to 87,000 cases and about 4 million people by 2005 (Figures 4 
and 5). In general, the number of qunti shijian had been rising at an alarmingly increasing 
rate. From a growth of about 10 per cent from 1995 to 1996, qunti shijian was growing at an 
average annual rate of as high as 25.5 per cent from 1997 to 2004, i.e. higher than the average 
growth rate of 22.2 per cent during the decade of 1994-2004, with annual growth in certain 
years reaching as high as above 40 per cent; or with 1994 figure indexed 100, a steep increase 
of the index from 100 to 740 in terms of the number of cases during the decade of 1994-2004 
(an increase of 6.4 times) and from 100 to 515 in terms of the number of people involved (an 
increase of 4.2 times) (ibid.). In terms of participants’ profiles, while at the beginning the 
people involved in these “mass incidents” were mainly xiagang workers and peasants 
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(reflecting land loss and corruption issues) but later on the list of participants expanded to 
include, besides xiagang workers32 and peasants who lost their lands, also workers, urban 
residents, private individual enterprise owners (getihu), teachers, students and a small number 
of ex-servicemen and cadres, etc. (Hu, Hu, He and Guo, 2009: 143), thus reflecting 
expanding and deepening popular interest conflicts and contradictions. 
 
 
Figure 3     China: Typology of Political Actions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Zhao (2008: 767), Figure 26-1. 
 
 
More recent cases of such public order disturbance were alarmingly on the rise in a 
series of serious incidents including year 2008’s high-profile conflicts of 28th June (in 
Guizhou), 5th July (Shaanxi), 10th July (Zhejiang), 17th July (Guangdong) and 19th July 
(Yunnan). Yet these constitute but just a small sample of the overall rise in social unrest 
across China in recent years, some of which involved ethnic conflicts33. Adding to these are 
the long-running Tibet conflicts including the March 2008 Lhasa riots and the March 2009 
conflict in Qinghai’s Guoluo Tibetan zizhizhou (“autonomous prefecture”)34, as well as the 
July 2009 Ürümqi riots. With the memory of the 1989 tragedy constantly hanging like the 
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sword of Damocles, the ruling regime is again facing a dire dilemma, as described by Tanner 
(2004): 
 
[…] the struggle to control unrest will force Beijing’s leaders to face riskier dilemmas than at 
any time since the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Experiments with less violent 
police tactics, economic concessions to demonstrators, and more fundamental institutional 
reforms all risk further encouraging protest in an increasingly restive society. Nevertheless, 
these challenges must be navigated if the party wants to avoid the ultimate dilemma of once 
again resorting to 1989-style violence or reluctantly engaging in a more fundamental 
renegotiation of power relations between the state and society. 
(Tanner, 2004: 138) 
 
 
Figure 4     China: Incidents of Public Protest (Qunti Shijian) 
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Source: Lum, 2006: 1-2; Tanner (2005), cited in Keidel (2005: 1), Table 1, data from Liaowang 
magazine and China Ministry of Public Security; Hu, Hu and Wang (2006). 
 
 
Figure 5     China: Numbers of People Involved in Public Protests (Qunti Shijian) 
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Source: Hu, Hu and Wang (2006). 
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Figure 6     China: Participants of “Mass Incidents” (Qunti Shijian) 
Workers
37.4%
Peasants
28.3%
Urban residents
11.9%
Former employees
8.2%
Private individual 
hawkers
3.9%
Others
10.3%
 
Note: Among “Workers”, one-third are workers of SOEs. “Others” includes a small number of ex-
servicemen, teachers, students, cadres etc. 
Source: Hu, Hu, He and Guo (2009: 143), Figure 3.2 (with data of 2001). 
 
 
The ruling CCP has not been oblivious to this deteriorating situation. Anti-corruption 
measures have continued to constitute a main prong in the Party’s political reform since the 
Jiang Zemin administration, as Jiang himself declared in 2002 in his last political report to the 
National Congress, “If we do not crack down on corruption, the flesh-and-blood ties between 
the party and the people will suffer a lot and the party will be in danger of losing its ruling 
position, or possibly heading for self-destruction.”35 Having averted such a dire scenario for 
the Party in 1989 via a bloody crackdown, CCP was in full awareness of the root cause of the 
Tiananmen protests. The predominantly Chinese squeaky clean, efficient tiny state of 
Singapore – and her long-ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) – has quite incongruently 
become a role model for the CCP to emulate.36 To the Western accusation that China’s so-
called “political reform” is nothing but a ruse since political reform in an authoritarian state 
should mean democratization and that China is copying a bad Singaporean model to develop 
its own version of neo-authoritarianism, combining free market economy with dissent-
muzzling one-party rule, China’s answer usually goes along the line like the West should 
recognize China’s specific national conditions and give due respect before China could reach 
the Western standards in human rights and democracy. Whether the neo-authoritarian 
experience of the corruption-free tiny city state of Singapore could effectively be emulated by 
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a huge country with one-fifth of humanity where corruption is endemic37 has always been a 
centre of debate, given the fact that China’s growing social unrest indeed reflects deep 
institutional problems of the evolving local State corporatism after 1989, as Minzner (2006) 
observed: 
 
Particularly at local levels of government, control over all formal political and legal 
institutions is centralized in the hands of the local Party secretary and a few deputies. These 
individuals exercise extensive control over institutions such as local legislatures, courts, Party 
disciplinary committees, and the media. This concentrated power in the hands of a few 
individuals breeds numerous problems. First, it allows corruption to thrive. Second, it allows 
local leaders to choke off the flow of information to higher-level leaders regarding policy 
failures that might reflect poorly on local officials’ performance. Third, it deprives citizens of 
effective redress of their rights through local legal and political institutions, particularly when 
the source of the violation is a local Party official. Chinese citizens appear to be increasingly 
resorting to mass protests and petitions directed at higher-level authorities as a means of 
circumventing the controls of local officials over legal and political institutions, and 
triggering the intervention of higher level officials in resolving their grievances. 
(Minzner, 2006: 9) 
 
While the CCP regime has in the post-1989 era led the country to economic miracle 
and hence, in the eyes of many, has successfully reasserted its legitimacy,38 this reassertion of 
legitimacy and unassailability has in reality not been immune to series of challenges, some 
rather severe and unexpected, since 1989. Underlying these are various thorny issues that 
emerged both in spite of and due to the astounding economic success, one of which being 
socioeconomic stratification as well as ethnoregional disparity that have gone from bad to 
worse over these years. It is in this overall atmosphere that, according to Dirlik and Prazniak, 
the real nature of the Chinese Communist Party-State on the one side and with it the so-called 
“China Model” of development, and the nature of political dissent on the other, should be 
understood: 
 
The legacies of the revolution and Bolshevik structure of the Communist Party are no 
doubt important elements in structuring Chinese politics. On the other hand, it needs to 
be kept in mind that what might be a necessity of revolutionary politics aimed at social 
transformation can easily degenerate into garden variety dictatorship designed to 
protect organizational and class interests. PRC politics presently partakes of both these 
elements. Increasingly, however, legitimation is located not in the necessities of 
developing toward some socialist vision but national goals of “wealth and power” […] 
Criticism that focuses on the legacies of revolution and socialism are misleading most 
egregiously in ignoring that it is nationalism, not socialism, that accounts for the 
behaviour of the regime. After all, the Chinese Revolution was a national revolution for 
autonomous development against “semi-colonialism”, with socialism as its vehicle. The 
vehicle gave the nationalism its particular flavour, but with the retreat from any 
operative vision of socialism, the latter seems more than ever merely a front for the 
national pursuit of wealth and power – under the leadership of the Communist Party. 
(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 291-293) 
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5.  Economic Inequality and Social Stratification 
 
Mental illness, mental breakdown and suicides are among the most outstanding of 
indicators of the negative impact of social change. Indeed, shocking the nation was the spate 
of suicides and attempted suicides39 at the Foxconn conglomerate’s factory in Shenzhen, 
Guangdong province, that resulted in the death or injury of more than a dozen workers within 
the short span of about 4 months (from the first suicide on 23 January 2010 to end of May), 
which continued with the fatal thirteenth and fourteenth “jumps” at its factories in Foshan, 
Guangdong, and Kunshan, Jiangsu, respectively on 20th July and 4th August40. Behind such 
heart-rending human tragedies lies increasingly acute socioeconomic inequality. The 
following account in a sense captures the essence of the problem: 
 
China is a profoundly polarised society, with hundreds of millions of impoverished workers 
and peasants at one pole, and a tiny capitalist elite at the other. According to a Boston 
Consulting Group study, China had 250,000 millionaire households in 2005, ranking the 
country sixth in the world. These households accounted for only 0.4 percent of the total, but 
controlled 70 percent of national wealth. 
(Chan, 2007) 
 
In addition, it was also alleged that almost 60 per cent of public revenue was used for the 
benefit of the 70 million-strong community of CCP cadres and apparatchiks who enjoyed a 
level of welfare – including healthcare, education and career opportunities – greatly higher 
than the ordinary citizens, and among the rich with wealth worth a hundred million yuan and 
above, 91 per cent or 2932 were the children of high-ranking CCP cadres and apparatchiks, 
possessing assets above 2.045 trillion yuan.41 
 
The fact that 70 per cent of China’s wealth was in the hand of 0.4 per cent of the 
people was confirmed by Cai Jiming, a Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee 
member, on the 6th Meeting of the 11th Standing Committee of the CPPCC, referring to an 
authoritative government department report.42 Cai emphasized that with 0.4 per cent of the 
people in control of 70 per cent of wealth, China’s wealth concentration was higher than that 
of the US. Proposing income tax and inheritance tax reforms, Cai emphasized that such 
wealth concentration in the hands of a minority of people has led to inadequate consumption 
and even distorted consumption. Such wealth concentration attests to contemporary China as 
 
[…] an outstanding example of the private appropriation of public resources that David 
Harvey has described as “accumulation by dispossession”. The Party’s claims to be the public 
has grown less con-vincing over the years with increasing evidence of the private disposal of 
the country’s wealth through party control of the economy. The new Chinese economic elite 
working through or with the Party does not differ much from its counterparts elsewhere in the 
unprecedented accumulation of wealth in the hands of a small minority of the population. The 
“blood-line” faction which has received much attention recently in connection with the Bo 
Xilai affair, and the prospective Party Chairman, Xi Jinping, goes so far as to claim special 
privileges for descendants of revolutionary party leaders that smacks of a new aristocratic 
formation in the making. 
(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 297) 
 
In fact, a recent report revealed that with luxury goods consumption reaching US$8.6 
billion, i.e. 25 per cent of the world market, China superseded US to become the world’s 
second largest luxury goods market by January 2009, ranked only after Japan.43 Other data 
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show that the degree of wealth concentration towards the rich in China is presently growing 
on average at an annual rate of 12.3 per cent which is double the world average growth rate. 
Such tendency is also reflected in sad state of the small and medium enterprises, with data 
showing the disappearance of 7,700,000 private businesses over the decade of 1994-2004 and 
the collapse of the middle class leading to an M-shape society.44 Such is the inevitable social 
consequence of a “China Model” miracle of rapid development built on what a critic called 
“low human rights advantage”45: 
 
Despite the ideological and organizational particularities of the PRC that are products of its 
revolutionary history, the accumulation of capital over the last three decades have been 
marked by class formations and relationships characteristic of the “primitive accumulation” of 
capital elsewhere. The distinction of the regime, derivative of its claims to socialism, is 
almost total control of resources, including labour, which under this “workers’ state” is not 
allowed to represent itself because it is already represented by the “socialist” regime […] 
Domestic accumulation has been achieved through the conversion of land into capital, in the 
process releasing huge amounts of cheap and controlled labour-power that then was put to use 
in the construction of cities, infrastructure projects, and industries. This labouring population 
also provided the workers and large numbers of women in export production financed by 
foreign and domestic capital that would make China into the “factory of the world”, and a 
major depository of global capital. 
(ibid.: 296) 
 
Regarding social stratification, Zhu (2007: 6-7) observed the existence in China of an 
enormous set of “identity circles” encompassing the whole society (Figure 7) – “agricultural 
population” circle, “urban residents” circle, “workers” circle, “cadres” circle46: 
1) Agricultural population: Those born into peasant families who have by informal procedure 
moved into other circles, even if having entered other classes or strata by work change or 
even having left the village the whole life, are still only considered peasants. 
2) Urban residents: Broadly speaking, all non-peasants belong to this group of “urban 
residents”. Formerly, “urban residents” narrowly defined refer to unemployed personnel – 
those without a fixed job. As “urban people”, they had a status higher than peasants, but as 
people without work units, their status was below “workers”. If they were formally employed 
by the labour department, even if they did work, they were just “temporary workers”. This 
community of “temporary workers” no longer exists since the 1990s, but the concept is still 
alive in people’s subconsciousness. 
3) Workers: All workers in accordance with whether they are managed by the government’s 
labour department or personnel department are divided into the “workers” and “cadres” sub-
circles. 
4) Cadres: From this sub-circle a further division can be made into “general cadres” and 
“leadership cadres”. Civil organizations in China, schools, and even public enterprises and 
their personnel are all subject to the so-called “administrative stratification”47. 
 
Members of the society are unable to completely follow their own will in moving 
across these four circles between which exist different economic and political conditions. 
Hence, between these four circles there exists a high-low relationship – in other words, this is 
not a multidimensional but a centripetal structure; moving towards the centre implies the 
raising of one’s social status. 
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Source: Zhu (2007: 6), Figure 1-1. 
 
 
 
Social stratification can indeed be traced back to the dawn of the Chinese civilization. 
From the Qin (Ch’in) Dynasty to the Qing (Ch’ing) Dynasty (221 BC – AD 1911), the 
imperial courts had always divided the Chinese populace into four strata – literati and 
officialdom (shi), agriculture (nong), labour/craftsmen (gong) and merchants/businessmen 
(shang), with both landlords and peasants included in the category of “nong” as the two 
major strata, followed by the two secondary strata of “gong” and “shang” (Table 7) – 
between which did exist a certain level of vertical mobility (Li, 2008b: 32-33). 
 
 
Table 7     China: Official Social Stratification, 1880s 
Class Number of households % 
Literati and officialdom (Shi)   1,500,000 2 
Agriculture (Nong) 56,000,000 80 
Industry and commerce (Gong shang) 12,500,000 18 
Total   70,000,000* 100 
 
* Total population around 350-400 million. 
Source: Li (2008b: 33), Table 2-2 (original source: Marsh, 1980: 15). 
 
 
Peasants 
Urban Residents 
Workers 
Cadres 
Figure 7     China: Identity Circles 
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Nevertheless, the traditional official categorization contains its own contradictions by 
grouping together landlords and peasants under “nong” and the upper-class big 
businessmen/merchants and the lower-class petty businessmen together under “shang”, and 
separating officials and literati from the landlord class where they actually belong to (ibid.: 
33). A clearer treatment of stratification is shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
Figure 8     China: Social Stratification in Late Qing (Ch’ing) Dynasty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Li (2008b: 33), Figure 2-1 (original source: The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 13, p. 30). 
 
 
 
Tremendous transformation came with the Communist revolution, and by 1958 
emerged a new structure of social stratification with the disappearance of the landlord class 
and the national bourgeoisie, and replacing them was the new upper class: the cadres – and as 
in the past, the huge peasant masses remained the country’s lower class (Li, 2008b: 50, see 
Figure 9). Moving into the 2000s Chinese social stratification has witnessed three major 
transformations – a third of the peasants are now the nongmingong (rural-to-urban migrant 
labour)48 whose total number is almost equal to that of the urban workers; urban non-SOE 
workers have greatly surpassed the SOE workers in number as the number of SOE workers 
has declined rapidly after 1997; rapid increase in the number of China’s reborn bourgeoisie 
(ibid.: 176, see Figure 10). Disagreeing with the underestimated official 2003 figure of 7.73 
million who were owners of private enterprises (see Figure 11), Li (2008b: 188) estimated the 
total number constituting the Chinese bourgeois class (though still represented a small 
segment between cadres and SOE workers) to be from 10 to 15 million, including four 
categories missed out in the official statistics: the large number of managerial personnel and 
local cadres who virtually turned into enterprise owners due to privatization of almost all 
5% - members of the royal household, 
ministers and officials, other members of the 
officialdom, landlords, big businessmen, 
candidates of imperial civil examinations 
95% - peasants, craftsmen and 
artisans, small businessmen 
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village and township enterprises within two to three years after 1998; the many cadres of the 
large number of small- and medium-scale SOEs and even a certain number of large SOEs 
which were privatized after 1997 who became the new owners of these enterprises; with the 
majority of large SOEs turning into joint-stock companies in the last decade, the large 
number of administrative personnel in these enterprises and some civil servants who were 
involved in regulating and administering the process of these SOEs turning into joint-stock 
companies had acquired huge volume of shares; unknown number of government officials 
who, having legally or illegally accumulated substantial volumes of wealth, invested the 
money in the share markets or saved it in local and overseas banks. Summing up the savings 
and interests, gains in stocks and shares and other non-salary incomes of these four categories 
of people would give amounts apparently higher than their wages and salaries (ibid.). 
 
An interesting question is that regarding China’s illusive “middle class”. The 
approach in Li’s model as shown in Figure 10 is, citing Gilbert (2003: 17), not to identify the 
Chinese “middle class” before China enters the stage of late industrialization or post-
industrialization, as the majority of the Chinese white-collar service-sector professionals are 
part of the upper classes of the cadres and the reborn bourgeoisie. The speed with which this 
presently illusive class is going to emerge unequivocally in the changing class pyramid 
depends of course on the dynamics of social mobility in the long process of modern Chinese 
industrialization. The impacts of China’s economic reform in the post-Mao period especially 
since the critical juncture of 1989 (a catalyst that led to Deng Xiaoping’s reaffirmation of the 
path of reform in his nanxun in 1992) on social mobility have been tremendous, and their 
significance is outstanding especially in view of the barriers that existed just before the 
reforms began (Figure 12) – the hukou/huji system, administrative documentation system and 
political status (ideological) barrier.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Li (2008b: 51), Figure 3-1. 
Cadres (10 million in 1959) 
Workers of State-owned 
enterprises (35 million in 1959) 
Peasants (200 million in 1959) 
Figure 9     China: Social Stratification, 1959-1979
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Figure 10     China: Social Stratification, Present 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Li (2008b: 176), Figure 8-1 and pp. 177-194. 
 
 
Figure 11     China: Resurgence of Bourgeois Class since 1989 
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Source: Li (2008b: 187), Figure 8-3. 
Cadres: 40 million cadres + 
more than 25 million quasi-cadres 
Urban workers: 29 million urban 
State-owned enterprise workers 
+ 160 million non-SOE workers 
Nongmingong (rural-to-
urban migrant labour): 
more than 200 million 
Bourgeois class: more than 
10 million private enterprise owners 
Peasants: more than 300 million 
Upper class: about 100 million 
(7.7% of total population of 1.3 
billion), including a still not 
well-defined but emerging 
“middle class” 
Lower class 
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Figure 12     China: Channels of Social Mobility and Barriers before Economic Reform 
        (Intragenerational Mobility) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Arrows represent the directions of mobility, percentages are rates of mobility. 
Source: Li (2008a: 497), Figure 17-1. 
 
 
 
 
The hukou barrier is the most insurmountable, and only a slim 5.2 per cent of peasants 
managed to cross this barrier during the 1940-1979 period (compared to the 13.1 per cent of 
workers who managed to move up into the cadre stratum), with 3.1 per cent becoming 
workers and 2.1 per cent becoming cadres (Li, 2008a: 497). Within the cadre stratum, 
political (ideological loyalty) barrier had blocked professional skilled personnel (who were 
thus marginalized and unstable within the cadre community) from moving upward into the 
organizational/enterprise cadre community, with only a slim 1.5 per cent passed the severe 
political scrutiny to advance into the latter (ibid.: 498). On the other hand, during this pre-
reform period there also existed downward mobility which could be explained by the 
temporary changing of status due to university enrolment and military service etc. as well as 
specific political policy changes and various political campaigns (ibid.: 498-499). All these 
manifestations of social mobility since economic reform began have resulted in the present 
overall structure of social stratification whose details could be illustrated as in Figure 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 Party, government, enterprise cadres 
       Cadres 
                                           1.5%        Professional skilled personnel 
Political status barrier
                                                  
Workers 
                                                  
Peasants 
13.1% 5.5%
  3.1%  8.1%
Documentation status barrier
15.3% 
Hukou status barrier
  2.1% 
Upper stratum 
Middle stratum 
Lower stratum 
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6. Domination and Assertion: Interpreting Chinese Sociopolitical Movements 
 
It is amidst such larger milieu of increasing economic inequality and social 
stratification which have bred acute social discontent and frequent and widespread public 
protest that contemporary China’s State-civil societal relations need to be understood. Since 
the brutal crushing of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, Chinese political dissent has 
survived essentially on two tracks. On the one hand are the exiled dissidents and their various 
organizations mainly based in the United States that make up the Chinese democracy 
movement in exile in which many survivals of the 1989 crackdown are still active, on the 
other there are the rights-defending activists and civil society organizations inside China 
which are threading a thin line within China’s spurious legal environment, fighting to right 
the social injustices caused by rampant corruption, State-business collusion, and the weiwen 
preoccupation that places stability above civil rights and political morality, while trying to 
avoid challenging CCP’s political monopoly. 
 
On the other hand, the reason that the Party-State may no longer opt to rule by just 
brute force like old-style dictators but choose to use more subtle forms of coercion beneath a 
coat of democratic trappings, including grassroots elections, modern free market, politically 
censored but otherwise free access to Internet and other social media and “evolving” rule of 
law, is simply that it has grown smarter with experience to realize that the old-style autocratic 
“thuggish repression” no longer works in this globalized Internet age, as William J. Dobson 
analyzes in his recent book The Dictator’s Learning Curve: Inside the Global Battle for 
Democracy (2012). 
 
Having evolved with the times into a much more public relations-savvy technocratic 
clique, operating by consensus at high levels while enhancing economic efficiency at the 
lower tiers of government, the modern Party-State thus presents a uniform face of a 
government that delivers to the citizens and the world to dissuade attempts to challenge or 
destabilize its political monopoly which is today, of course, no longer purely a matter of 
politics and governance, as the Party-State has grown into a complex nexus of politico-
pecuniary interests, a gargantuan structure of interfeeding power, favour and lucre with 
simply too much to lose. In other words, the once ideal-driven Chinese Communist Party is 
today 
 
[…] no longer just a political but also an economic class which has a direct interest in the 
accumulation of capital. It has so far been more successful than its predecessors in the 
twentieth century in convincing the population that its interests are also the national interest, 
but how long it can do so is anybody’s case. One of the particularities of the PRC is that the 
organizational apparatus that has enabled its development is equally efficient as an instrument 
of repression so long as it retains its coherence, which it has done successfully so far through 
the distribution of economic rewards and privileges throughout the organization. We should 
remember that the Communist Party and its auxiliary organizations make up around 20 per 
cent of the population. 
(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 297-298) 
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Semi-employed personnel, 3.6% 
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 5 Major Socioeconomic Classes        10 Major Social Strata 
Figure 13     China: Present Structure of Social Stratification
Note: Arrow indicates that the whole or a part of a social stratum 
concerned can be included in one of the five major social classes. 
Sources: Han (2009: 127), Figure 9.1; Li and Chen (2004: 13), 
Figure 1-3. 
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How exactly does the civil society respond in such a political milieu? Figure 14 shows 
a matrix of Chinese nonviolent action (NVA) movements. On the horizontal axis is the 
strategic dimension, or the “tactical-strategic” dimension of Weber and Burrowes’s typology 
of NVA, which indicates “the depth of analysis, the ultimate aim and the operational time-
frame which activists use” (Weber and Burrowes, 1991). In the context of contemporary 
China, along this strategic spectrum could be found protesters in 1989’s student-led 
demonstrations and members of today’s Falungong resistance movement who represent the 
more “reformative” (or “tactical” in Weber and Burrowes’s terminology) exponents of NVA 
in terms of their assertive orientation, and who resort to short- to medium-term campaigns in 
pursuing a particular goal within an existing social framework, setting their eyes on reform, 
but not revolution. Protesters in 1989’s student-led demonstrations were not revolutionaries 
aiming to overthrow the CCP as in the interpretation of the hardliners in convincing Deng 
Xiaoping to order the bloody crackdown, but common people from all walks of life voicing 
their demands for rectifying mainly corruption-related social injustices, as understood by the 
conscientious Zhao Ziyang who objected to but failed to avert the violent suppression – an 
unavoidable social development over the first decade of market reform that culminated in an 
intolerable gap between what the masses got (vis-à-vis the élite) and what they really wanted, 
as portrayed in Figure 15. 
 
 
 
Figure 14     Matrix of Chinese NVA 
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For instance, the post-1989 pro-democracy dissidents, whether domestically based or 
in exile, and probably to a lesser extent the rights-defending (weiquan) activists, whether 
single-issue or cross-issue advocates, fall in terms of their assertive orientation more towards 
the “transformative” (or “strategic” in Weber and Burrowes’s terminology) pole, as they are 
being guided more by a “structural analysis of social relationships”, with their main concern 
being about the fundamental transformation of society and hence their particular campaigns 
being conducted within the context of a long-term revolutionary strategy (Weber and 
Burrowes, 1991). The weiquan activists can be seen slightly less “transformative” than those 
in the democracy movement, for unlike the latter, the weiquan activists are often compelled 
to advocate a regime change towards multiparty liberal democracy simply as a result of the 
disillusionment with a Party-State which is too repressive and unaccommodating. With a less 
repressive leadership which is more caring in responding to their demands, these weiquan 
activists or at least some of them would probably choose to retreat further from the 
“transformative” pole, and instead of pressing for multiparty liberal democracy, would accept 
extensive reform of the Party-State as an alternative. 
 
 
 
Figure 15     China: Expanding Demand for Political Institutional Change, 1978-1989 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Base on Davies’s J-Curve Theory of Revolution; see Vander Zanden (1988: 584), Figure 21.2 
(adapted from Davies, 1962: 6, Figure 1). 
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“It is not an accident that former Premier Wen Jiabao once called himself ‘grandpa 
Wen’ – Wen yeye – in front of the people”, noted Hung (2011). In a sense, the role of Wen, 
long cultivated as the loving grand patriarch who is at every scene of disaster to offer moral 
care for his “children”, is orchestrated to be an on-site projection of the central Party-State as 
the modern successor of the caring benevolent emperor who was always there to zuozhu (do 
justice) for his downtrodden subjects and punish his abusive officials, in a system that 
survives till today in the form of shangfang (travelling to the capital for petitioning) by the 
abused people suffering in the hands of corrupt local officials. Such an image is crucial to the 
survival of the Party-State, as any self-seeking dynasty-builder has long been acquainted with, 
for the mandate of heaven would be lost if that image is shattered – ever since Mencius 
(Meng Zi) emphasized two thousand three hundred years ago the people’s satisfaction as an 
indicator of a ruler’s moral right to power, and justified the overthrow of an unworthy ruler49. 
Just imagine if Wen Jiabao does have the power and leverage within the Party-State to 
translate his caring image into a force that would turn the Party-State into a less repressive, 
more benevolent political monopoly, giving due consideration to contemporary China’s 
tortured history as well as her potential for breaking up, it probably would not be too far-
fetched to think that most of the weiquan activists whose advocacy is increasingly converging 
with the wider democracy movement might move further back from the “transformative” 
pole and be content with intra-Party-State institutional reform rather than revolutionary 
regime shift to multiparty electoral democracy. It is a fact that even under the present 
repressive atmosphere, most of the weiquan activists are careful to show that they are 
protesting to rather than against the central CCP government by limiting their demand for 
redressing civil grievances to single issues and localizing the targets of their protests, and 
justifying their actions by appealing to the written laws and constitution of the People’s 
Republic. Immediately after the escape from his two-year house arrest in Shandong, the blind 
civil rights lawyer Chen Guangcheng brought a video clip to Youtube asking Premier Wen 
Jiabao to enforce justice (zuozhu) by punishing the Shandong officials, hence in a way 
endorsing the authority of the CCP central government. In a recent interview by the 
Yangguang Shiwu magazine50, He Peirong (“Pearl”/Zhenzhu) reiterated that she was not a 
pro-democracy activist but just a simple person who felt the need to assist those other civil 
rights activists who were being persecuted by the authorities. Despite her apparent contempt 
for the Shandong government that perpetuated the injustice towards Chen Guangcheng, He 
Peirong said during the interview that she was more concerned with effectiveness of her 
action than unending rhetoric criticizing the government, for it is always important to leave 
“face” for the government, i.e. to be realistic in order to open space for positive interaction 
with the government in solving problems, and that she would rather believe in gradualism in 
building a democratic society. Such utterances of moderation of course also reflect the 
vulnerability of the civil rights activists, especially those who are less known internationally 
and hence more helpless in the face of State persecution and abuse, who desperately need to 
protect themselves against the recurring charge of “inciting subversion of State power” that 
the State has been unfailingly using to put them away. Such asymmetry in power relationship 
between the weiquan activism’s assertion and the Party-State’s domination (which while 
coercive, does exhibits certain degree of tactical flexibility as in the case of the Wukan 
uprising and the Shifang incident) that could at the risk of oversimplification be probably 
described as “mutualistic symbiosis” (see Figure 16), i.e. to a certain extent benefiting both 
sides. 
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Figure 16     State Domination and NVA Assertion: Mutualistic Symbiosis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Schema based on Vaughan and Archer (1971: 16-32). 
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conscientious and moderate faction of the Party – to eventually bring about meaningful 
reform of the Party-State as a partner and a means to promote social justice. They, as 
portrayed in Figure 5, hence fall on the “fundamental” wing of the spectrum, to be exponents 
who, as Weber and Burrowes described, “choose nonviolent action for ethical reasons and 
believe in the unity of means and ends” and more fundamentally, “may view nonviolence as a 
way of life” rather merely as an instrument of political struggle – be that a manifestation of 
some personal belief or faith, or an acceptance of a second-best solution after carefully 
weighing the costs and benefits of, or of the struggle for, more drastic structural 
transformations. Related to Figure 14, a three-dimensional typology of political actions in 
terms of degree of targeted change, degree of institutionalization/routinization and degree of 
organization of the Party-State and the NVA, including the ethnoterritorial movements, is 
shown in Figure 17. 
 
 
 
Figure 17     China: Typology of Political Actions of Contemporary Sociopolitical Actors 
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With the carrot-and-stick approach to maintain its survival, the once-brutal-
dictatorship-turned-benevolent-dictablanda (à la O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986) 51  has 
managed to preserve the status quo of its own rule as well as the interests of the “other 
power-holders” by both selling the credit it claimed on behalf the industrious, enterprising 
and persevering masses whose newly freed entrepreneurial spirit, long-recognized in the 
communities of their brethren worldwide, resulted from the Party’s repudiation of the Maoist 
policies, has doubtlessly led to the country’s economic success during the economic reform 
decades since 1979, as well as extracting the support of these “other power-holders” who are 
willing to abdicate their opportunity to rule in exchange for other kinds of protection by the 
ensuing strong State run by the present regime (Stepan, 1985), in a faute de mieux deal much 
akin to Karl Marx’s description of the Bonapartist regime in The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Napoleon (1852). Marx’s classic analysis of Bonapartism as a basis of State autonomy 
rests mainly in the sharing of common interests between the State and the dominant group, 
which in the case of contemporary China, the ruling CCP regime and the dominant social 
élite and groups whose inability to overcome the present State’s monopoly of violence to 
force a regime change has given the Party-State the opportunity to use the leverage gained 
both to preserve the status quo and to propound its claim as the protector of stability and 
prosperity in exchange for the acceptance of its legitimacy, for even when ‘a government’s 
use of force imposes a large cost, some people may well decide that the government’s other 
services outbalance the costs of acceding to its monopoly of violence’ (Tilly, 1985: 172), 
though it could turn out to be a Faustian bargain that these social élite and interest groups 
might live to rue. In the stylized representation in Yeoh (2010: 254, Figure 8), proscription of 
even the slightest manifestation of dissent against the one-party rule has managed to contain 
societal political action to the routine intra-party politics at the far bottom right-hand corner, 
despite the sporadic outbursts of people power usually stemming from localized grievances 
which have always been quickly suppressed. Amidst all this, individual political actors are 
playing a central role in giving existence to the obduracy of the system, for the causal powers 
of systems and structures cannot exist without the mediation through the human agency, as 
Archer (2003) admits despite her rejection of the theorem of the duality of agency and 
structure. 
 
Hence, while State-making gives existence to durable instruments of surveillance and 
control within a country, the establishment of the State apparatus, together with the process of 
war making and resource extraction, also necessitates the forming of alliances by State 
managers with specific social classes, whose members contribute resources and technical 
services, as well as assist to ensure the compliance of the rest of the population, “all in return 
for a measure of protection against their own rivals and enemies” (Tilly, 1985: 181, 183) who 
of course include the massive labouring classes always need to be suppressed and subdued – 
which in turn seems to respond to the question posed by Lynn White at the beginning of her 
book Political Booms: Why are all the main parties in the East Asian countries she studied 
including China’s ex- but still nominally communist party so business-oriented and relatively 
uninterested in workers? (White, 2009: 3) On the other hand, it is indeed a basic 
characteristic of such a racketeer government – one that perpetuate its power through 
violence – that brutality is part and parcel of its drive to maintain stability, at all costs. 
 
“At all costs” indeed – for instance for the whole country, the government’s weiwen 
(maintaining stability) allocation amounted to 7.017 hundred billion yuan in 2012 (which the 
government defined as “public security” expenditures), as compared to 6.703 hundred billion 
yuan for national defense.52 Professor Sun Liping of Tsinghua University’s Faculty of Social 
Sciences in a recent report 53  comments on the sharp increase in the very high weiwen 
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expenditure which in some places has reached a spare-no-expense, regardless-of-cost 
proportion. Part of these expenses actually do not make economic sense, according to Yu 
Jianrong, director of the Center for the Study of Social Issues at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, as, e.g., ten thousand yuan spent on blocking a shangfang petitioner could 
have been better spent on helping to solve the petitioner’s problems. The root of the issue is 
of course that the cause of the shangfang lies more often then not in corrupt State-business 
collusion whose tentacles go deep into the core of the racketeer State, while the shangfang-
weiquan activism is seen as a destabilizing element threatening the rule of the one-party State. 
Such worries on the part of the Party-State are not unfounded, for a normally tolerable gap 
that exists between the tolerant threshold of and actual social injustice due to effective 
“protection” function of a racketeer government could grow into uncontrollable proportions if 
left unchecked, as illustrated in Figure 18. Such great emphasis on weiwen and containment 
of the threat from the dissidents as reflected in the rocketing weiwen cost seen above can be 
observed in the tremendous expansion of the power of the Zhengfawei (Political and Legal 
Committee of the CCP) since the June 1989 Beijing massacre. The Central Political and 
Legal Committee of the CCP in its present form which was set up in 1980 was abolished in 
1988 under Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang’s effort of political reform that suggested the 
separation of Party and Government but was reinstalled after the massacre and the purge of 
Zhao Ziyang. The dropping of Zhengfawei secretary from CCP’s Politburo Standing 
Committee when the latter’s membership was reverted from nine to seven with the 
conclusion of the 18th National Congress of the CCP on 15th November 2012 thus has to be 
one of the most significant institutional changes amidst the leadership transition that has 
otherwise shown little surprises given the overall “conservative” make-up of new standing 
committee.54 
 
The reason for the unparalleled quest for economic achievement, of reckless GDPism 
at the expense of equity, and the spare-no-expense cultivation of a glorious national image 
from the 0.9 billion-yuan 2008 Olympic opening gala to the space programme within a 
national environment of widespread poverty, widening inequality and increasingly acute 
social injustice as a result of such runaway development can be and in fact needs to be seen in 
the same light. 55  In an article later deleted from Gongshiwang, 56  Chinese scholar Cai 
Shenkun questions whether a yearly spending of hundreds of billions of yuan on a million-
strong Chinese police force (or probably above ten million if inclusive of local non-police or 
para-police public security teams) within an environment devoid of judicial independence is 
leading to out-of-control, self-justified weiwen-induced corruption. 
 
Defining a racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction, 
Tilly (1985), by such standard, considers governments’ provision of protection as qualifying 
as racketeering: 
 
To the extent that the threats against which a given government protects its citizens are 
imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized a 
protection racket. Since governments themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even 
fabricate threats of external war and since the repressive and extractive activities of 
governments often constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens, 
many governments operate in essentially the same ways as racketeers. 
(Tilly, 1985: 171) 
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Figure 18     Social Injustice under a Racketeer Government and Fundamental Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Davies’s J-Curve Theory of Revolution. See Vander Zanden (1988: 584), Figure 
21.2 (adapted from Davies, 1962: 6, Figure 1). 
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According to economic historian Federic Lane, it is the business of governments to 
sell protection, regardless of whether people would want this protection. Seeing from the 
economic perspective, Lane’s argument for State’s monopoly of violence is based on the fact 
that the very activity of producing and controlling violence enjoys large economies of scale, 
hence is in favour of a monopoly (competition would in general raise costs) (Lane, 1950, 
1958)58, which in turn gives rise to a “tribute” (i.e. monopoly profit) that is otherwise called 
“extortion” in Ames and Rapp’s adaptation which sees analogy of such government action 
with predation, coercion, piracy, banditry and racketeering (Ames and Rapp, 1977).59 
 
In a critique of Lane, Tilly (1985: 181) breaks organized violence perpetrated by 
agents of states down into four different activities: war making (“eliminating or neutralizing 
their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as 
wielders of force”), State making (“eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those 
territories”), protection (“eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients”), and 
extraction (“acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities – war making, state 
making, and protection”), all of which being dependent upon the State’s tendency to 
monopolize the concentrated means of coercion. “From the perspectives of those who 
dominate the state,” posits Tilly, “each of them – if carried on effectively – generally 
reinforces the others.” Upon successfully eliminating its internal rivals – in the context of the 
bloody history of the CCP, the “anti-revolutionaries”, opponents of the one-party State and 
other dissidents – the State greatly strengthens its ability to extract resources, to wage war or 
simply to flex its military muscles in the regional or global arena, and to protect its chief 
supporters, who were the landlords, armed retainers of the monarch, and churchmen in 
European history (ibid.) and in our present context consist of cadres and apparatchiks, and 
even “princelings” and Party-linked businessmen who are central to the interest and survival 
of the Party-State, as well as the co-opted intellectuals serving to uphold the image of 
legitimacy of the regime. 
 
This brings us back to the issue of the regime’s legitimacy which relies so much on 
CCP’s seemingly proven ability to deliver on the economic front and China’s astounding new 
national strength for which the Party has been given so much or even sole credit. Contrary to 
the “receptive to the governed” argument60, legitimacy according to Arthur Stinchcombe 
depends rather little on abstract principle or assent of the governed for the “person over whom 
power is exercised is not usually as important as other power-holders” (Stinchcombe, 1968: 
150, italics in the original)61 the probability of whose confirmation of the decisions of a given 
authority constitutes the latter’s legitimacy. These other authorities, says Tilly (1985), “are 
much more likely to confirm the decisions of a challenged authority that controls substantial 
force; not only fear of retaliation, but also desire to maintain a stable environment 
recommend that general rule [which] underscores the importance of the authority’s monopoly 
of force” (Tilly, 1985: 171-172). Lynn White in her four-country study62 of money-power 
nexus observed that: “By no means are state agents the only powerholders with whom 
business owners (as well as regional gangsters and mob-affiliated political canvassers) make 
liaisons. They also link up with each other. The coherent state, even if it behaves as a single 
actor, is just one of the interlocutors for other networks in either a fair or coercive ‘civil’ 
polity.” (White, 2009: 37) In a wider context, it is in this way that these “other power-
holders”, be they societal pressure groups, professionals, or academics and the intelligentsia, 
“have been co-opted into the decision-making process, rewarded with perks and privileges, 
and are no longer available as a source of inspiration [for the dissident activists …]”, having 
retreated “from ‘politically engaged and intellectually oppositional topics’ to inquiries 
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reconcilable with the prevailing order and designed to legitimate the hegemonic order” 
(Benton, 2010: 321-322)63. The “hegemonic order” here refers to that of a regime claiming 
credit for the economic successes that brought along heightened international stature and 
diplomatic prowess and propounding existing stability as the key to continued economic 
prosperity which itself actually being the unfailing characteristic of the Chinese and Chinese 
diaspora worldwide – an achievement which could have been brought to fruition naturally by 
the people once the Maoist yoke, both in the forms of the suppression of free entrepreneurial 
spirit and the political horrors, was lifted by the same regime that had foisted that yoke upon 
the Chinese people for three decades since 1949.64 Anyhow, according Tilly, a tendency to 
monopolize the means of violence “makes a government’s claim to provide protection, in 
either the comforting or the ominous sense of the word, more credible and more difficult to 
resist” (Tilly, 1985: 172). 
 
Hence, while many authors inside and outside China have been lauding the country’s 
“grassroots democratization” and intra-Party reforms as pointing to a promising path of de-
authoritarian evolvement, the perception that China is moving out from the “politically closed 
authoritarian” category of regime type65 could prove to be as misleadingly whimsical as it is 
empirical unfounded. Furthermore, past record of mismanagement and repressive, often 
violent, response to dissent, including the excesses during the Cultural Revolution both in 
China proper and in the ethnic regions like Tibet and Xinjiang, and the June Fourth atrocities, 
may not be encouraging for many. 
 
On the side of the civil societal response to State repression, as can be seen earlier in 
Figure 14, while the current weiquan activism shares much with the wider democracy 
movement in terms of assertion for social justice and necessary political defiance, the two 
diverge when it comes to both practical strategy and fundamental ideological outlook and 
such differences would inevitably engender deviations in the nature of commitment to NVA 
and approach to conflict with the opponent. After all, as Dirlik and Prazniak observe, 
 
[…] the question of dissent covers a broad spectrum: from liberal aspirations to a 
democracy similar to those of other advanced societies to the defense of legal rights, 
intellectual freedom and the pursuit of justice (if not equality) within the existing 
system to anti-colonial struggles for autonomy among minority peoples, and the 
struggles for autonomy and democracy in Hong Kong. If these struggles share one 
thing in common, it is the demand upon the Party-state for greater openness and respect 
or laws. Otherwise, they are also at odds with one another in their various causes with 
divisive consequences. It would be difficult if not impossible to find even on the left 
many who would condone greater autonomy to Tibet and Xinjiang, or letting go of 
Taiwan or Hong Kong […] Dissent, in other words, is not just a matter of democracy 
and communism but shares in all the complexities of Chinese politics. 
(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 289-291) 
 
Such unity and differences are shown in Table 8 and Table 9. For instance, related to 
the issue of “means and ends”, it would be interesting to see how the leadership changes in 
CCP (reflecting its factional struggles) after its 18th National Congress as well as possible 
factional changes in the governments in exile (post-Dalai Lama scenario for the Tibetan 
government in exile, developments in World Uyghur Congress and Southern Mongolian 
Democratic Alliance) will affect the State’s approach in terms of suppression or 
accommodation and minorities’ response in terms of moderation or radicalism in their 
continued struggle for ethnic self-determination whether in the form of autonomy or 
secessionism. 
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Table 8     Chinese Democracy Movement and Weiquan Activism: The Strategic Dimension 
 
 Democracy Movement Weiquan Action 
Criterion Transformative, revolutionist Reformative, involutional 
Analysis of Social Framework Relatively structural; focusing on 
a structural analysis of overall 
sociopolitical relationships 
Relatively conservative; 
focusing on a particular goal 
within an existing sociopolitical 
framework 
Aim Revolution (planned change of 
system) 
Reform (planned change of 
elements within a system) 
Operational Timeframe Long Term Short/Medium Term 
 
Source: Based on framework from Weber and Burrowes (1991); Vinthagen (2010). 
 
 
 
Table 9   Chinese Democracy Movement and Weiquan Activism: The Ideological Dimension 
 
 Democracy Movement Weiquan Action 
Criterion Instrumental, practical Fundamental, ideational 
Nature of Commitment Despite lack of progress, still 
committed to NVA as the most 
plausible and effective means to 
effect change 
Despite State persecution under 
the pretext of weiwen, still 
committed to NVA as ethically 
best in fighting for social justice 
Means and Ends Relentless persecution by the 
Party-State and frustration over 
lack of progress of a moderate 
approach could be leading to 
belief that means and ends are 
separable, precipitating 
radicalism, e.g. justification of 
“lies against lies” in media 
combat, especially in territorial 
ethnic minority resistance 
movements which could more 
easily foster a “we vs. they” 
mentality 
Believing in the unity and  
indivisibility of means and ends, 
because the end can never justify 
the means “for the simple and 
obvious reason that the means 
employed determine the nature of 
the ends produced” (Huxley, 
1938: 9) 
Approach to Conflict with the 
Party-State 
Incompatible interests; aiming at 
terminating one-party political 
monopoly and replacing it with 
multi-party free and fair electoral 
system; rejecting the compromise 
solution of a dictablanda or a 
benevolent ruler within the Party-
State 
Shared interests, at least with the 
more liberal, reformist and 
moderate faction within the 
Party-State; looking more for 
synergy of action together with 
“enlightened” members of the 
central Party-State against local 
corruption and abuse of power 
Approach to Opponent (Party-
State) 
Disillusioned with the traditional 
idea of waiting for an 
“enlightened ruler” (mingjun) 
within the system (imperial court 
in the old days; the one-party 
State today), hence in a 
competitive relationship with 
ruling Party-State to destroy the 
Party’s political monopoly 
Seeking cooperation at least with 
the more liberal, reformist and 
moderate faction within the 
Party-State to zuozhu (enforce 
justice) for the people 
 
Source: Based on framework from Weber and Burrowes (1991); Vinthagen (2010). 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This paper has purveyed various key issues underlying China’s socioeconomic and 
sociopolitical transition, such as poverty, inequality and social stratification, and the relations 
between structure and agency within the overall political milieu in contemporary China 
where social change is moving apace amidst astounding economic transformation. Ironically, 
as pointed out in the paper, some factors which at first look seem to be system-threatening 
may instead work for the ruling regime’s advantage. According to Perry (2002), for instance, 
social protests in today’s China constitute one of the major components of social stability, as 
the protests serve as checks against the leaders’ abuse of power and as mechanisms ensuring 
the accountability of the government, thereby “undergirding rather than undermining the 
political system” in China’s authoritarian polity where multi-party competitive elections do 
not exist to provide an effective check on the misbehaviour of State authorities.66 In addition, 
Tong and Lei (2010: 499-500) considered large-scale mass incidents driven by economic 
grievances, which were due to “the misconduct of local officials or the process of 
socioeconomic transformation when there was a lack of experience in handling these 
problems or the lack of proper regulations”, as not regime-threatening because by asking the 
government to zuozhu (enforce justice), the protests had in fact endorsed the legitimacy of the 
regime, and as long as the regime had plenty of financial resources to satisfy the protesters’ 
demands – hence the significance of GDPism as a cornerstone of regime maintenance – it 
further consolidates its legitimacy. On the other hand, in the case of inequality, Friedman 
(2009) argued that the beneficiaries of economic growth were able to find their own 
individual solutions to their problems and resigned themselves to an authoritarian 
government as a defense against the threat from potentially vengeful losers in the market 
economy, thereby rendering social polarization inconducive to democratic sentiment among 
them.67 
 
It is thus in such situational context that the largely single-issue civil rights activisms 
are struggling to work within China’s current written legal framework (that at least is in 
existence on paper) and in most cases what they are challenging are the corrupt or extra-
judicial practices, abuses of power and other excesses of the local – provincial, county, 
prefecture, municipal or village – governments, authorities or officials rather than the 
legitimacy of the CCP-monopoly of the central State, and they are hence in a way, even just 
in a tactical way, endorsing the legitimacy of CCP’s right to rule. However, to consider such 
single-issue civil rights activisms as posing little threat to CCP’s enforced political monopoly 
is to underestimate their potential threat to the CCP central State by ignoring their intrinsic 
concertedness with the wider democracy movement (which by itself is currently 
characterized distinctively by weakness in both bargaining power and instrumental activities) 
in in terms of the common struggle for humans rights – a “jasmine revolution-style” spectre 
as illustrated in Figure 19 – though the relative emphasis on either political rights or civil 
liberties could differ in some ways from one to another mainly due to environmental 
differences and as a response to constraints on the ground. Such constraints, as shown in 
Figure 20, largely come more directly from the local governments, authorities or officials, 
and the degree of brutality and excesses differs from locality to locality, depending variously 
on local political atmosphere, the relative power of hardliners68 vis-à-vis the more liberal, or 
at least less hard-line, factions69 projected through the appointments of local party secretaries 
and other officials, the degree of discretion of the local governments and officials derived 
much from a complex web of tier-to-tier linkages all the way up to the centre through a whole 
range of illicit but prevalent arrangements of bribery and lobbying, and the choice of the 
central government to continue turning a blind eye towards the excesses of the local 
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governments and officials which it tacitly endorses as its hatchet men to protect central power 
and whose brutality is in many ways a direct result of the pressure from the centre to weiwen, 
or alternatively the tactical decision of the centre to tolerate a more liberal, benevolent 
approach at the local level in a particular case at a particular time. A good example is a 
comparison between the local government’s treatment of Chen Guangcheng in Shandong and 
the Wukan incident in Guangdong. 
 
Clamping down on civil rights activists and whistle blowers like Cheng Guangcheng, 
Hu Jia and Ai Weiwei on the basis of weiwen could be initiated directly from the central 
government if the voicing of grievances were to be seen by the latter as potentially risky and 
possible to trigger a wider movement especially in view of the recent trend of coalescence of 
single-issue activisms – a spectre also illustrated in Figure 19 and a phenomenon that brings 
to mind how the 1989 Tiananmen protests that started off as students’ protests circled around 
campus dormitory conditions, jobs and corruption, triggered by the death of the respected 
former president Hu Yaobang, soon escalated into a wider movement joined by intellectuals, 
reporters and others from all walks of life, which finally and inevitably spiraled into general 
pro-democracy demonstrations that threatened the political monopoly of the CCP. 
 
 
 
Figure 19     State Domination and NVA Assertion: Institutional Reconfiguration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Schema based on Vaughan and Archer (1971: 16-32). 
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Figure 20     Assertion, Constraint and Institutional Conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Schema based on Vaughan and Archer (1971: 16-32). 
 
 
Or it could be, sometimes according to voices from the centre, a result of over-zealous 
implementation on the part of the local leaders and cadres. Guangdong’s deputy party 
secretary cum Zhengfawei (Political and Legal Committee of the CCP) secretary Zhu 
Mingguo, who was sent to set up a working group to deal with the Wukan crisis, has 
commented on what he criticized as “lopsided interpretation of ‘stability above all else’” on 
the part of some local government leaders and cadres, which has led to inappropriate 
responses to “mass incidents” as the misguided logic of equating “being safe and sound” as 
“being without incident”, according to him, has resulted not in rights-oriented but power-
oriented weiwen, not active but passive weiwen, and not harmonious but coercive weiwen. 
(“一些地方和领导干部片面理解 ‘稳定压倒一切’, 认为平安就是 ‘不出事’ … 这种逻辑
下的维稳, 不是权利维稳, 而是权力维稳; 不是动态维稳, 而是静态维稳; 不是和谐维稳, 
而是强制维稳。”)70 
 
Many would see that relying on such “power-oriented, coercive weiwen” while 
postponing critical decisions on the last leg of reform – that in the political sphere – could 
only be postponing the inevitable and in fact accentuating the existing social contradictions, 
for both the speed and volatility brought about by the country’s breakneck economic 
transformation under increasing morphogenesis are making whatever State-sanctioned system 
with the bottom line of one-party rule short-lived in viability when all State-guided modi 
vivendi as such could be at best pro tem, though Dirlik and Prazniak have questioned such 
teleological anticipation by placing the present Chinese authoritarian capitalism in a global 
comparative context: 
 
Viewed through the prism of the primitive accumulation of capital within the context of 
global capitalism, the PRC’s developmental trajectory invites a more sociological approach to 
questions of social protest and political repression. We may ask, for instance, whether in the 
expropriation of land rights, the concentration of wealth, the exploitation and mistreatment of 
labour, immense class, gender, ethnic and racial differences, and violent suppression of 
challenges to the status quo, the contemporary PRC might compare favourably with the 
United States in the second half of the 19th century – without even referring to civil war and 
the colonial abjection of the native population? How does the PRC compare in these regards 
with other contemporary societies embarked on “primitive accumulation,” from Brazil and 
Instrumental Activities
Bargaining Power Ideology 
Political Monopoly 
Constraint on Opposition Ideology 
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South Africa, to Turkey, Russia and India? Is the excessive preoccupation with repression in 
the PRC a function not of its record as such as it is of the greater visibility it has acquired on 
the world scene by virtue of successful economic development? On the other hand, this 
comparison also raises the question of whether or not the PRC may be able to follow the same 
trajectory as the United States earlier moving toward a more egalitarian and just society once 
done with the business of “primitive accumulation?” If that was possible at an earlier time, is 
it still possible under conditions of global capitalism? 
(Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012: 298) 
 
Finally, according to the results of an Internet survey conducted during April-May 
2012 by Li Kaisheng, an associate professor at the Xiangtan University in China’s Hunan 
Province, released on the Gongshiwang, an academic thought website, a majority of the 
respondents were found to be favouring the Western, North Atlantic liberal democratic 
political system based on separation of powers.71 The survey was conducted from 13th April 
2012 to 13th May 2012 with a returned sample of 4,697. The conduct of this survey, 
according to Li, stemmed from his conviction that what really determines China’s future is 
not or mainly is not the thought of an élite minority, but the opinion and cognition of the 
majority of the masses towards the country and its society. His survey results show that 
among the political systems which the respondents were most in favour of the top five were 
that of the United State of America (71.98 per cent), Sweden (32.38 per cent), United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (30.76 per cent), Germany (28.81 per cent) 
and Singapore (27.51 per cent). On the other hand, top the list of political systems the 
respondents were most not in favour of were that of North Korea (73.62 per cent) and China 
(54.12 per cent), followed by Iran, Vietnam and Pakistan. Besides that, the majority of 
respondents viewed corruption, inadequate degree of democratization and social injustice as 
the biggest challenges facing today’s China, with 81 per cent of the respondents considering 
the problem of corruption as “very serious” and 17 per cent “relatively serious”. Putting aside 
the usual limitations of such on-line Internet surveys, which in this case is further 
complicated by the fact that the posting of its results on the Gongshiwang had apparently 
been swiftly deleted by the website administrators72, the results have lent support to the well 
recognized subtle undercurrents going on in the scene of Chinese sociopolitical change – the 
subliminal changes surging beneath the State-orchestrated projectable changes which still 
continue to draw a line against adopting North Atlantic democracy and its trias politica 
(tripartite separation of powers) for checks and balances73, as shown in Figure 21, based on 
Reeler’s threefold theory of social change (Reeler, 2007). 74  “Left alone, crises do get 
unconsciously resolved over time, tragically or happily or somewhere in-between”, observed 
Reeler (2007: 12), “But they can also be more consciously and proactively resolved through 
well led or facilitated transformative change processes.” The resolution of the 1989 crisis in a 
tragedy and the purge of the political reformists in a way shut down the transformative 
change wing75 of the bifurcation facing the CCP at that time and led to the protracted cold 
stuckness in sociopolitical modernization and its uneasy coexistence with accelerated market 
reform that brought national economic prosperity. Nevertheless, at this time of such overall 
economic success and unprecedented national strength, while hymns are being sung, 
justifiably, to short-term economic miracle and national glory, much care should probably be 
taken in the officially sanctioned building of a “people first” (yi min wei ben) “harmonious 
society” (hexie shehui) that such eulogizing would not be at the expense of the golden 
opportunities for more holistic transformative reforms, and that in full recognition of the 
overt and subliminal emergent changes that have not ceased to exist as undercurrents in a 
nexus of contradictions beneath the officially sanctioned projectable changes, these 
projectable changes would not be looked upon as policy guidance simply to maintain and 
justify the cult of a dictablanda at the expense of the long-term greater good. 
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State-led projectable change since 
1978 – socialist market economy, 
socialism with Chinese 
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epitomized by Wei Jingsheng’s “The Fifth 
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on“Democracy Wall” on 5th December 1978, 
Hu-Zhao liberalization … 
Subliminal or latent emergent 
change was occurring since 1978 
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entrepreneurship, getihu, etc. 
bringing about subtle yet crucial 
society-wide socio-psychological 
change as prelude to change  in 
political demands, Hu Yaobang’s 
passing (1989) … 
Greatly expanded popular demand for 
a more liberal and just society, as 
backlash to the accentuated corruption 
and social injustice as by-products of 
market-oriented economic reform 
unaccompanied by liberal democratic 
political reform and Deng Xiaoping’s 
intolerance of “bourgeois 
liberalization”, led to the hot crisis of 
1989, followed by cold stuckness in 
political institutional change after the 
June Fourth massacre …
Overt emergent change post-1989: 
emergence of middle class; rise of 
peripheral nationalisms – March 2008 
Lhasa riots, 5th July 2009 Ürümqi riots; 
increasingly vocal weiquan activism  … 
 
Subliminal or latent emergent change post-1989: Taiwan’s democratization 
(December 1989; 1996); “Handover” of Hong Kong (1997) and Macau (1999): 
implications on political and civil liberties; Zhao Ziyang’s passing (2005) and 
publication of memoir (2009); deepening socioeconomic inequalities, interethnic 
contradictions, anomie and social neurosis – school killings, “mass incidents”, 
dingzihu and forced relocations; deepening corruption and guan-shang goujie, 
worker suicides, plight of nongmingong; escape of Chen Guangcheng, suicide of 
Zha Weilin and Li Wangyang’s allegedly “being suicided”, progress in political 
reform in Vietnam and Burma and the restoring of political rights for Aung San 
Suu Kyi symbolizing renewed hope for Burmese democratization … 
Uncovering roots of 
crisis, unlearning 
preconceived “cardinal 
principles” 
Turning point: Facing the real will to 
change; dealing with resistance to change 
Adopting new values, ideas 
Creating a new situation 
Projectable change post-1989: Deng’s nanxun brought continuous economic reforms leading to 
economic miracle; four cardinal principles reaffirming and upholding CCP’s political supremacy; 
thought control; resistance to bourgeois liberalization; Deng’s “stability above all else” directive 
led to Party-State’s ruthless weiwen; socialism with Chinese characteristics; Party-State’s 
promotion of fundamental definition of human rights as just the people’s rights to be fed, to be 
sheltered, to be educated and to be employed; continued Dengist stance against adopting North 
Atlantic democracy and its trias politica (tripartite separation of powers) for checks and balances, 
promoting central State nationalism and cracking down on peripheral nationalisms; controlled 
intra-Party democratization, grassroot democracy: village elections, “stick and carrot” co-optation 
and control of intellectuals, building of “harmonious society”, central State’s tacit consent to local 
repression under the weiwen preoccupation; crackdown on Falungong; becoming world’s 2nd 
largest economy while on the road to a polished dictablanda …
Figure 21     China’s Political Institutional Change since 1978: Institutions, Agents and Events 
Alternative U-process of transformative change 
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4 When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World, 
London: Allen Lane, 2009. 
5 Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press., 2011. 
6 See, e.g., Qi (2010: 420). 
7  See a recent WikiLeaks’s revelation of a telegraph from Shanghai’s American consulate to 
Washington in October 2007 (ODN, 5th August 2012). Current news items in this paper, unless 
otherwise stated, are sourced from 东方日报 (Oriental Daily News/ODN), a Malaysian daily in 
Chinese, with China news sources mainly from the Hong Kong and Taiwan media. 
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8 Public grievances against such frenzied quest for GDP growth with little regard for human and 
environmental consequences have led some Chinese netizens to translate GDP mockingly as “gou de 
pi 狗的屁”, meaning “dog’s fart”. 
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since the mid- and late 1980s been steady at about 70 per cent of her total national public spending, 
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spending in total national public spending are only respectively 46 per cent, 40 per cent and 38 per 
cent. From the angle of central-local economic relations, China is also one of the most, or to some, 
even the most economically decentralized countries in the world, with most parts of resources 
controlled by the local governments, including the allocation of land, energy and financial resources 
(ibid.: 187). In fact, one of the characteristics of China’s economic decentralization is the relative self-
sufficiency of the local economy whether at the provincial level or the county level. The local 
governments are fully responsible for the launching and coordination of local reform, for local 
economic development, and for the legislation and law enforcement within their respective 
jurisdictions. Such a characteristic not only marks China’s economic institution apart from a central 
planning economic system, but also makes her local governments more powerful in competences than 
the local governments in most federal countries in the world. (ibid.: 188) 
11 <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/2012-07/31/content_15634274.htm>; 人民网/中国共产党新
闻网  <http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/0731/c136457-18634867.html>; Ming Pao 明報  (Hong 
Kong), 13th August 2012. 
12 ODN, 31st August 2012. 
13 The largest denomination of China’s renminbi 人民币 (“people’s currency”, Rmb) is yuan 元 / 圆 
(Latinized symbol ¥ or Ұ), a term with cognates in the Japanese yen or en 円 (from 圓; Latinized 
symbol ¥) and Korean wŏn원 / 圓 (Latinized symbol ₩). A yuan is equivalent to about US$0.146. 
14 Bert Hoffman, “Access to Opportunity Eases Income Inequality”, The Star (Malaysian daily), 21st 
January 2006. 
15 Or more officially, the “Communist Party of China” (CPC). 
16 Yan (2010: 179), based on data from China Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
17 In general, though not totally without ambiguity, “private entrepreneurs” or “private enterprise 
owners” (siying qiyezhu 私营企业主 / minying qiyejia 民营企业家) here refer mainly to owners of 
domestic individually owned, family-based or shareholding firms with eight or more employees 
though joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned firms are not by definition excluded, while individual 
entrepreneurs who employ fewer than eight employees are referred to as “self-employed” / getihu 个
体户. For more details on the ten major social strata, see Li and Chen (2004: 13), Figure 1-3, and 
Yeoh (2010: 270), Figure 18. 
18 Cited by Tong and Lei (2010: 488), the 2008 figure being from an estimate reported by Andrew 
Jacobs, “Dragons, Dancing Ones, Set-off a Riot in China”, New York Times, 10th February 2009, and 
an estimate of 90,000 such incidents annually for 2007, 2008, and 2009 being quoted from a Chinese 
insider by John Garnaut, “China Insider Sees Revolution Brewing”, Sidney Morning Herald, 2nd 
March 2010. 
19  The term “xiagang” refers to redundant workers mainly at State enterprises, without directly 
describing them as “unemployed”. Still officially attached to their work units or enterprises, the 
xiagang workers continue to receive basic minimum subsidies for their living and medical expenses, 
and are encouraged to change job, probably through State-run job and re-employment centres, or go 
into small businesses. In line with State enterprise reforms, the number of xiagang workers has been 
on the rise: 4 million in 1995, 8 million in 1996, 12 million in 1997, 16 million in 1998, 20 million in 
1999, though dropping to 11 million in 2001. (Zhou, 2006: 289) 
20 See Chen (2004: 32), cited in Tong and Lei (2010:  488-489). 
21 ODN, 13th June 2011, 18th June 2011. 
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22 ODN, 12th June 2011, 18th June 2011. 
23 ODN, 14th June 2011. 
24 In contrast with “free-floating aggression”, the more general concept of “scapegoating” is reserved 
for the transfer of hostility towards any object (Turner and Killian, 1957:19). 
25 Occuring in Foshan 佛山, Shenzhen 深圳, Guangzhou 广州, Huizhou 惠州, Shangrao 上饶, 
Qingdao 青岛, Changchun 长春, Taiyuan 太原, Sanya 三亚, Zhongshan 中山, Shanwei 汕尾, 
Ningde 宁德, Hefei 合肥, Xuzhou 徐州, Shijiazhuang 石家庄, Chengdu 成都, Nanping 南平, 
Beijing 北京 and Wuhan 武汉, some resulted in severe clashes between protesters and police (ODN, 
21st October 2012). 
26 ODN, 29th December 2011. 
27 The tragedies befalling people who are forced to be relocated are vividly recorded in a recent book 
relating heart-rending tales of people who would not submit to the forced relocation to make way for 
the Shanghai World Expo of 2010 – a dark side of the glorious event that involved people being 
beaten to death, tortured and imprisoned (see Du Bin 杜斌 (2010), Shanghai Kulou Di 上海骷髏地
/Shanghai Calvary, Taipei: Ming Pao Ch’upanshe 明報出版社 (Ming Pao Press)). Also little reported 
is the plight of the 1.27 million people relocated to make way for the construction of the Three Gorges 
Dam, a monstrous project that put under water Hubei and Chongqing’s 20 districts and counties, over 
270 villages and townships, over 1500 enterprises and over 34 million squared metres of houses. Like 
the above case of Shanghai, with low compensation, these “Three Gorges migrants” have since been 
suffering from psychological problems common to uprooted people, facing problems of adaptation, 
often exploited by the local authorities and feeling discriminated by the locals, and some migrant 
villages have turned into vice dens. (东方日报, 7th June 2010) 
28 Often translated as “nail house”, dingzihu refers to a household who refuses to be relocated to make 
way for real estate development. 
29  Hu Angang (2006), Great Transformations in China: Challenges and Opportunities, Oxford 
University Press, cited in Hutton (2006: 127). 
30 Weiquan refers to the quest for protecting and defending the civil rights of the citizenry by non-
State actors. Shangfang, a centuries-old tradition in China, refers to the action of people with 
grievances who take the last resort of going to Beijing, the capital, to attempt to get their complaints 
heard against local injustice. 
31 东方日报, 18th March 2009. 
32  The term “xiagang” refers to redundant workers mainly at State enterprises, without directly 
describing them as “unemployed”. Still officially attached to their work units or enterprises, the 
xiagang workers continue to receive basic minimum subsidies for their living and medical expenses, 
and are encouraged to change job, probably through State-run job and re-employment centres, or go 
into small businesses. In line with State enterprise reforms, the number of xiagang workers has been 
on the rise: 4 million in 1995, 8 million in 1996, 12 million in 1997, 16 million in 1998, 20 million in 
1999, though dropping to 11 million in 2001. (Zhou, 2006: 289) 
33 Such as the bloody Han-Hui ethnic conflicts in 2004 and 2007. 
34 东方日报, 23rd March 2009. 
35 Cited in Hutton (2006: 126). 
36 See, for instance, Professor Lü Yuanli 吕元礼’s best-selling Chinese tome “Why Can Singapore Do 
It?” (2007). 
37 Ultimately, as Fang (1991: 254-255) warned, “There is no rational basis for a belief that this kind of 
dictatorship can overcome the corruption that it itself has bred. Based on this problem alone, we need 
more effective means of public supervision and a more independent judiciary. This means, in effect, 
more democracy.” (“China’s Despair and China’s Hope”, originally appeared in The New York 
Review of Books on 2nd February 1989, translated by Perry Link.) Describing China as “doubtless a 
post-totalitarian regime ruled by a ruthless Party”, Béja (2009: 14-15) ruminated on the 20th 
anniversary of the Beijing-Tiananmen massacre: “Twenty years after the 4 June 1989 massacre, the 
CCP seems to have reinforced its legitimacy. It has not followed the communist regimes of the Soviet 
bloc into oblivion. Its policies of elite cooptation, subtle response to social contradictions, and 
Emile K.K. Yeoh, Teleological Ambiguities of the China Model                ICS, UM-EAI, NUS Conference, 12-13 September 2013 
 59
                                                                                                                                                        
instrumental support for the ‘rule of law’ have become major complements to its continued control 
over the press and the political system. It has made concessions to prevent discontent from 
crystallizing into social movements that might challenge its rule, and it has sent in the police to 
silence dissidents. Over the course of the same two decades, the opposition has had to wrestle with the 
trauma of the June 4 Massacre and the huge difficulties that it has raised for anyone who would 
challenge the CCP’s primacy.” 
38 See, e.g. Bo (2010). In an interesting attempt at refutation of Minxin Pei’s (2006) claim of CCP’s 
illegitimacy, Bo has set out to refute point by point Pei’s arguments which were based upon a series of 
international indexes which the former listed in details: “China is one of the most authoritarian 
political systems in the world according to the Polity IV Project, is almost completely ‘unfree’ 
according to the Freedom House; and is one of the most corrupt countries according to Transparency 
International. China was ranked in the bottom third of the eighty countries surveyed in terms of 
‘quality of governance ranking’ according to one group of the World Bank and was considered a 
weak state according to another group of the World Bank. China found itself next to the legion of 
failed states and most repressive countries in terms of ‘voice and accountability’ and also in the 
company of weak states such as Nicaragua, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, Egypt, and Mali in terms 
of ‘regulatory quality’. China was no better than Namibia, Croatia, Kuwait, and Mexico in terms of 
‘government effectiveness’, was comparable to Belarus, Mexico, Tunisia, and Cuba in terms of 
‘political stability’, and was in the company of Mexico, Madagascar, and Lebanon in terms of ‘rule of 
law’.” (Bo, 2010: 102-103, citing Pei, 2006: 5-6) 
39 Despite rumoured allegation that some cases could be murders linked to the factory security office 
(大纪元时報 (The Epoch Times (Malaysia)), Issue 93, June 2010). 
40 东方日报 (Oriental Daily News, Malaysian daily), 21st July 2010 and 6th August 2010. Currently 
the number of suicides in China is huge. Suicide is now the fifth main cause of death in China where 
there are over 250 thousand people killing themselves every year, with a rate of a suicide every two 
minutes (Wang, 2008: 755). On average every day there are about 750 people in China committing 
suicide, and there are an additional number of 2 million people attempting suicide (non-fatal) in China 
every year (ibid.; Tang, 2007). In terms of age distribution, suicide rate in China is highest among the 
elderly and within the 25-34 year-old cohort; in terms of gender, China’s female suicide rate is 
apparently higher than male, particularly for rural female and especially high for the 25-34 year-old 
cohort and women above age 65 (Wang, 2008: 755; Xiao, Wang and Xu, 2003). 
41  东方日报 , 17th February 2009 and 29th June 2009. Following the US (rather than British) 
convention, billion = 1000,000,000 and trillion = 1000,000,000,000. 
42 东方日报, 23rd June 2009. 
43 东方日报, 29th June 2009. 
44 东方日报, 29th June 2009. 
45 Qin Hui (2009), “China’s Low Human Rights Advantage”, China Rights Forum, No. 1, pp. 85-89, 
cited in Dirlik and Prazniak (2012: 296). 
46 Nongye renkou quan 农业人口圈, chengzhen jumin quan 城镇居民圈, gongren quan 工人圈, 
ganbu quan 干部圈. 
47 Xingzheng jibie 行政级别. 
48 Totaled about 130 million, China’s nongmingong have today turned into a unique community of 
breathtaking proportions. With a high degree of mobility, the over a hundred million people shuttling 
on the railways and roadways of China every year during the Spring Festival (chunjie 春节 – Chinese 
New Year) have become a unique phenomenon in the world (东方日报, 30th March 2009). 
49 Mencius, edited and translated with an introduction by D.C. Lau, London: Penguin Books, 2005 
(Penguin Classics first published 1970). 
50 Kuang Da 旷达, “Nanjing Nüzi Zhenzhu: Wo Bushi Yingxiong 南京女子珍珠: 我不是英雄” 
[Pearl from Nanjing: I’m not a hero], Yangguang Shiwu 阳光时务, 18th May 2012. 
51 O’Donnell and Schmitter opines that a transition from authoritarian rule could produce a democracy, 
but it could also terminate with a liberalized authoritarian regime (dictablanda) or a restrictive, 
illiberal democracy (democradura) (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 9, cited in Diamond, 2002: 24). 
Emile K.K. Yeoh, Teleological Ambiguities of the China Model                ICS, UM-EAI, NUS Conference, 12-13 September 2013 
 60
                                                                                                                                                        
While shadows of the remnants of her ghostly past still linger to haunt the one-party State, there are 
already telling signs that the continuing transformation from a dictadura (dictatorship) into a 
dictablanda leading further to a highly restrictive democradura in the near future is the most possible 
direction the CCP regime is heading to and indeed planning to head to, given the fact that the Western, 
“bourgeois liberal” democracy (democracia) has already been ruled out of the cards, or at least not 
until mid-2000s. In fact, following Professor Zhou Tianyong from the Central Party School, China’s 
authoritarian one-party political system will and should remain unchanged until at least 2037 (Zhou, 
Wang and Wang (eds), 2007: 2, 6, 45-46, see Bo, 2009: 10-11). This is in line with what Deng 
Xiaoping stated in 1987, that direct general elections could only be held after half a century had 
passed in the 2000s, and at the moment the country had to make do with indirect elections above the 
county level and direct elections only at county and below county level, given the colossal population 
and inadequate level of cultural quality of the people (Hu, Hu, He and Guo, 2009: 19-20, cited from 
《邓小平文选》第 3 卷, 人民出版社 1993 年版, 第 220～221 页). 
52 According to a 30th April 2012 Reuters report (see Hai Tao, 2012); see also report in ODN, 17th 
November 2012. 
53 “Yi Liyi Biaoda Zhiduhua Shixian Shehui de Changzhijiu’an 以利益表达制度化实现社会的长治
久安” [Realizing society’s long-term governance and stability by institutionalization of interest 
expression], cited in “Gonggong Anquan Zhangdan 公共安全账单” [Bill of public securuty], 
Caijing 财经 [Finance and economics], 9 May 2011. 
54 ODN, 17th November 2012. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Cai Shenkun 蔡慎坤, “Zhongguo Teshe Weiwen Fuchu le Duoda Daijia 中国特色维稳付
出了多大代价？ ” [What is the price of stability maintenance with special Chinese 
characteristics?], Gongshiwang 共识网, 10th May 2012. 
57 Garnaut citing a disillusioned “princeling” and former PLA colonel, Chen Xiaolu 陈小鲁, son of 
one of China's 10 great marshals, Chen Yi 陈毅. 
58 Cited in Tilly (1985: 175). 
59 Cited in Tilly (1985: 175). 
60 See Bo (2010: 117). 
61 Cited in Tilly (1985: 171). 
62 On China, Thailand, Taiwan and the Philippines. 
63 Citing Lewis and Xue (2003: 933); Ma (2007); Xu (1999: 1, 168). 
64 Indeed, building upon the foundation set by the Hu-Zhao administration’s audacious reformist 
programmes, Deng Xiaoping moved forward from where his purged former protégés have left by 
reinvigorating the post-Tiananmen chilling politico-economic milieu through his “southern tour” 
(nanxun 南巡) in 1992, culminating lately in China first superseding Germany to become the world’s 
third largest economy in early 2008, ranked only after the United States of America and Japan, and 
finally superseding Japan in mid-2010 to become the world’s number 2. According to a report 
published on China’s National Bureau of Statistics website on 14th January 2009, the confirmed 2007 
GDP of China at current prices amounted to 25.7306 trillion yuan, an increase of 13 per cent from the 
previous year (ODN, 16 January 2009). While observed to be still short of a third of US’s GDP, 
analysts had predicted China’s GDP to overtake Japan’s in three to four years, just as it overtook the 
United Kingdom and France in 2005 and Germany in 2008. Nevertheless, according to an 
announcement by Yi Gang 易纲, the director of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange and the 
deputy governor of China’s central bank, the People's Bank of China, on 30 July 2010, China had 
already superseded Japan to become the world’s second largest economy in 2010. However, in terms 
of GDP per capita, Japan’s (US$37,800) was more than 10 times that of China (US$3,600) in year 
2009, and Japan’s GDP per capita ranking, while having dropped from world’s number 2 in 1993 to 
number 23 by 2008, was still far ahead of China’s which ranked beyond 100 (ODN, 9 August 2010). 
65 See taxonomy in Diamond (2002: 30-31), Table 2. 
66 Cited in Tong and Lei (2010: 499). 
67 Cited in Benton (2010: 321). 
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68 Largely seen to be presently represented in the centre mainly by the still influential Jiang Zemin 
faction, though the real power configuration could be less simple. 
69 Largely seen to be presently represented by the Wen Jiabao faction, though again, the real power 
configuration could be more delicate. 
70 Lianhe Zaobao 联合早报 (Singapore newspaper), 19th July 2012. 
71 Li’s survey also found that as high as 73.66 per cent of respondents stated non-participation in any 
non-governmental organizations (NGO). In an interview by the Voice of America, Hu Xingdou 胡星
斗, a professor of economics at the Beijing Institute of Technology (北京理工大学), opined that 
the proportion should correctly be 99 or 100 per cent due to the basic fact that the presently so-called 
“NGOs” in China could hardly be recognized as NGOs because Chinese law demanded government 
linkage or dependency for an “NGO” as such in most parts of the country, hence strictly speaking 
there were no real NGOs in China (Voice of America, as reported in ODN, 16th July 2012). 
72 Accessing the article “李开盛：中国网民的政治与社会认知 —— 基于互联网的调查” [Li 
Kaisheng: the political and social notion of China’s netizens – an Internet-based survey” 
(http://www.21ccom.net/plus/view.php?aid=8089) at Gongshiwang returned the line “文章被删
除或正在审核中!!” [essay has been deleted or is being checked!!] (accessed 16th July 2012). 
73 “In developing our democracy, we cannot simply copy bourgeois democracy, or introduce the 
system of a balance of three powers. I have often criticized people in power in the United States, 
saying that actually they have three governments. Of course, the American bourgeoisie uses this 
system in dealing with other countries, but when it comes to internal affairs, the three branches often 
pull in different directions, and that makes trouble. We cannot adopt such a system.” – Deng Xiaoping, 
“Take a Clear-Cut Stand against Bourgeois Liberalization”, 30th December 1986. 
<http://web.peopledaily.com.cn/english/dengxp/vol3/text/c1630.html> 
74 See Yeoh (2010) for its adaptation for the Chinese context. 
75 As illustrated in Figure 21, a particular choice at the moment of crisis could thus lead to protracted 
cold stuckness, instead of a U-process of transformative change (Reeler, 2007: 12): in the case of 
China, a road not taken over two decades ago in 1989. 
